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INTRODUCTION

As society continues to move "on-line"' and technology advances in
fields such as biotechnology, a paradigm shift is occurring. Investors are
focusing less on asset valuations based on the physical goods owned by a
particular firm and more on the value of intangibles-the information and
know-how possessed by the firm and embodied in its intellectual property
rights. 2 Firms and even entire industries have grown up with the primarily
paper assets of patents and copyrights. 3
At first glance, this trend might seem vaguely interesting as a
sociological matter, but of scant interest from a legal perspective. After all,
the federal intellectual property laws,4 particularly patent and copyright,
have been with us almost since the inception of this country. 5 Therefore, it

1. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, Advertising in Cyberspace: Business and Legal Considerations,
Computer Law, Sept. 1995, at 1 (stating that the number of users on the Internet currently
exceeds 30 million).
2. See generally Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, Valuation of Intellectual Property and
Intangible Assets ix (2d ed. 1994) (noting that intellectual property "has arrived" as the most
important corporate asset); Stuart A. Rosenberg, Searchingfor Value Legal Times, Oct. 23,
1995, at 44 (demonstrating the increasing need to value intangibles as businesses discover that
their assets are undervalued by sole reliance on the valuation of physical property). Of course,
intellectual property rights-particularly patent-have historically been important, albeit more
so in some industries than others. The point is that intellectual property rights are becoming
increasingly important as new technologies develop. "
3. For example, the biotechnology industry has historically relied heavily on patent
protection to attract investment. The investment dollars generated have enabled the industry
to prosper even in the absence of a large number of FDA-approved (i.e., marketable) drugs.
See generally Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False Start? The Impact ofFederal
Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on Reg. 163 (1996) (discussing the economic
development of the biotechnology industry).
4. When using the terms "intellectual property system" or "federal intellectual property
law," this Article is referring to the federal statutes relating to patent, copyright, and
trademark protection. There are other statutes, such as The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (1996), which also address intellectual property protection. However,
the patent, copyright, and trademark schemes are the foundational statutes regarding
intellectual property and therefore will be the focus of this Article.
5. The first Copyright Act, (Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124-126), and the first
Patent Act, (Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112), were enacted in 1790. The first
Trademark Act was enacted in 1870, (Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217), but was
held unconstitutional in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-99 (1879) (holding that Congress
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seems reasonable to assume that most legal issues related to intellectual
property have been resolved over time or, if not resolved, at least readily
articulated within an established legal framework. New technologies might
be dealt with within this existing framework since they present the same
issues as conventional works, albeit in different packaging.6
However, new technologies have in fact posed substantial questions
for and challenges to the intellectual property system that Congress and
the courts have begun to address in a well-publicized manner.

lacked the power to legislate a trademark act without jurisdictional limits under either U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the patent-copyright clause) or the Commerce Clause). The modern
federal trademark enactment is embodied in the Lanham Act of 1946, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1996). All three Acts have been substantially revised over time. Major revisions
to the Copyright Act were enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. See William F. Patry,
Latman's The Copyright Law 2-15 (6th ed. 1986) (outlining the roots and history of copyright
laws). The Patent Act underwent a major revision in 1952. See L.James Harris, Some Aspects of
the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 658, 658-62
(1955). The Lanham Act was substantially revised in 1988. See Todd B. Carver, Vhat is the
Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988?, 16 U. Dayton L Rev. 129, 129-30 (1990).
Proposals to amend all three Acts occupy a good deal of congressional time. See, e.g., Pending
Patent Reforms Are Approved by Judiciaty Committee, 52 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 19798 (June 13, 1996) (outlining proposed changes to the Patent Act relating to the publication
of patent applications, term extensions and reexamination procedures and a proposal to
establish the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) as a government corporation); Two Days of
Hearings on NIl Bill Consider ProviderLiability and Fair Use, 51 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 484-86 (Feb. 15, 1996) (detailing H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 which propose revisions to the
Copyright Act to account for technological changes and to facilitate establishing a National
Information Infrastructure (NII)); President Clinton Signs Trademark Dilution Bill, 51 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 371-72 (Jan. 18, 1996) (discussing amendments to the
Lanham Act to protect famous marks). For a discussion of changes and developments in the
three Acts to comply with the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT) and advances
in technology, see generally IntellectualProperty 1995 Outlook: Efforts Continue to Set Rules Amidst
Rapidly ChangingTechnology, Uan.-June] Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA), at C-22 (Feb. 2, 1995).
6. See generallyJeffrey Squires, Copyright and Compilations in the Computer Era: Old Wine in
New Bottles 24 Bull. of Copyright Soc'y 18 (1976) (discussing the need for copyright
protection for on-line databases analogous to that provided to hard copy compilations).
7. Computer technology in particular has generated a large number of issues. See, e.g.,
ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'g 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (upholding the enforceability of boilerplate software license agreements and
contracts conferring copyright type rights on uncopyrightable data); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815-16 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804, 805 (1996)
(holding that a menu command hierarchy was an uncopyrightable "method of operation" in
an opinion receiving extensive coverage and industry attention); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-line Communication Servs. Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-81 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(discussing the difficult issue of the liability of computer bulletin board operators for
copyright infringement by subscribers). Congress has recently begun to consider issues raised
by new technologies in a high-profile manner. See, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: A Preliminary Draft of the
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995) (discussing the issues
arising in implementing a national information superhighway and the changes in intellectual
property laws that may be required); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Finding
a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of Technological
Change (1992) (addressing the appropriate scope of copyright and patent protection for
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Unfortunately, the intellectual property system does not exist in a vacuum,
but rather coexists with both federal and state legislation and common law.
Thus, the debate to date has been incomplete. While the debate is
addressing challenges to the intellectual property statutes themselves, it
often ignores the question of how to achieve the goals of those statutes
within the larger legal framework.
In particular, the exploitation of intellectual property rights
increasingly involves the rightholder's entering into transactions involving
commercial law. Yet there is neither a contract nor coherent commercial
law of intellectual property-only state common law and the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC)-neither of which has considerations of federal
intellectual property law policy at its center. Thus, while the efforts of
Congress and the courts to deal with new technologies under the
intellectual property statutes are both necessary and desirable, those efforts
divert attention from a question which is of equal importance. That
question is, "How do intellectual property and contract laws fit together?"
The answer to this question will undoubtedly influence the development of
an information-based economy. The relative dearth of legal scholarship
addressing this issue is therefore somewhat remarkable and disconcerting;
this issue should be considered comprehensively and systematically
now 9 -before ad hoc judicial decisions impair the market for licensing
intellectual property rights.
Any attempt to provide a theoretical framework for integrating
intellectual property and contract law must take into account the fact that
the two systems of law proceed from different philosophical frameworks.
software and complications facing producers and users of digital information). For a
discussion of the congressional efforts to grapple with issues raised by the industry in human
genetics, see Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra note 3.
8. See Robert P. Merges, IntellectualProperty and The Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review
Essay, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1570, 1571 (1995) ("[W]e need a contract law of intellectual property,
and not just a commercial law.").
9. For the most comprehensive treatment to date, see generally Peter A. Alces& Harold
F. See, The Commercial Law of Intellectual Property (1994) ("Commercial legislation and
intellectual property principles are experiencing dramatic adjustment as a result of
technological, social and legislative innovation; it is, therefore, propitious to discern the
available common threads."). Id.at xxix. For reviews of Alces & See, see Alan M. Fisch, Seeking
the Intersection of Two Legal Sets: A Review of the Commercial Law ofIntellectualProperty, 19 Colum.VLAJ.L. & Arts 301 (1995); Merges, supra note 8 (reviewing Alces and See and also arguing
for an integrated treatment of intellectual property and contract). For a treatment of the
specific issue of preemption of software license terms under patent and copyright law, see I.
Trotter Hardy, Copyright, Contracts, and Preemption in a DigitalWorl, 1 U. Rich. J. L & Tech. II
(1995); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L Rev. 1239
(1995); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyight
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke LJ. 479 (1995) (arguing against preemption and
listing other authorities). For a good discussion of one of the issues raised in this Article, see •
generally Preston Moore & Edward Mayfield, Patent Infringement and the Buyer's Right to Cover
UnderArtide2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6J. Proprietary Rts. 2 (1994) (arguing that buyers
engaging in internal cover after the licensor's breach should not be considered infringers
under the patent laws).
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The analysis should begin by identifying what those frameworks are and
the goals which they seek to implement. The analysis should then proceed
by trying to fit the two sets of law together in a manner which, to the
extent possible, furthers both sets of objectives. The aim of this Article is to
use such an analysis to address an important problem at the intersection of
intellectual property and the UCC.'0
More specifically, this Article acknowledges that because intellectual
property licenses often grant the licensee the right to manufacture a good
covered by Article 2 ("Sales") of the UCC," collisions between intellectual
property law and the UCC are likely to become more frequent as the sheer
volume of transactions traditionally viewed as sales, but also containing an
intellectual property component, increases over time. One area of potential
conflict is between the remedial provisions of intellectual property law and
those of the UCC. Under the UCC, an aggrieved seller has a statutory right
to set its damages by entering the market and reselling the contract goods.
Likewise, an aggrieved buyer may set its damages by entering the market
and making a substitute ("cover") purchase. However, when the aggrieved
seller or buyer is also an intellectual property licensee, the aggrieved
party's exercise of these UCC remedies may be considered infringement
under one or more of the intellectual property statutes.
An intuitive legal response would be to say that a finding of
infringement under such circumstances is the correct result. Basic
preemption rules 2 require that in the event of a clash, the remedial
provisions of the state-law UCC may not displace remedies under the
federal intellectual property scheme. However, this intuitive response may
be neither legally correct nor otherwise desirable; yet resolution of this
issue is important to maintaining a viable licensing market. If intellectual
property law is used effectively to remove one or more UCC remedies from
aggrieved parties, the entire bargaining structure of transactions changes,
and the goals of the UCC,which include encouraging efficient contracting,
are threatened. This result might be desirable if allowing a party to
exercise a particular UCC remedy would adversely affect the goals of the
intellectual property system. However, if those goals are not threatened,
removing UCC remedies may result in parties foregoing otherwise socially

10. This, of course, is not to deny the need for a general contract law of intellectual
property, but rather to initiate the debate by focusing on one topic which is manageable in
scope as well as important to the marketplace. Focusing on this issue helps to establish the
framework within which the larger debate may take place.
11. Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1996). Even given this
scope limitation, Article 2 has often been applied by analogy to transactions that are similar to
sales of goods. For example, Article 2 was often applied to leases prior to the enactment of
Article 2A of the UCC ("Leases") and may also be used to address issues arising in bailment
or other shared interest transactions. See Alces & See, supra note 9 (discussing "transactions"
in goods). See also infra note 69 (defining goods).
12. These preemption rules include the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S.
Const. art. VI, § 2, and statutory preemption under § 301 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
301 (1996).
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beneficial transactions without a concomitant increase in the types of
activities that the intellectual property statutes were meant to foster.
This Article argues that federal intellectual property law should
support application of the remedial provisions of the UCC in many
situations, and that the use of such remedies is fully consistent with the
policies of both the UCC and intellectual property law. More specifically, it
argues that the default rule should be one which allows an aggrieved
licensee to exercise its relevant UCC remedy of resale or cover without
being subject to liability for intellectual property infringement. In other
words, this Article argues that the property rights granted by the
intellectual property statutes do not extend to preventing the otherwise
rightful exercise of UCC remedies. This rule is preferable to the current
legal uncertainty because it encourages the parties to make efficient
decisions regarding whether and under what terms to contract and
whether to breach a contract once it is made.
To help frame the ultimate issue, Part I discusses and compares the
theoretical underpinnings of both intellectual property law and the UCC,
including their respective remedial provisions. Part II then briefly outlines
the factual scenarios which seemingly give rise to a conflict between
intellectual property law and the UCC and the judicial response in specific
cases. Part III discusses the desirability of current law from a policy
perspective, arguing that the uncertainty of current law is both inefficient
and otherwise undesirable. Part IV proposes revisions to the UCC to help
ensure that the appropriate remedial scheme is adopted to foster the goals
of both the UCC and federal intellectual property law.

I. A POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON THE REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND THE UCC
Congress, the courts, and scholars often cite an economic basis as the
rationale for both federal intellectual property law and the UCC. However,
the nuances of that rationale differ substantially in the two contexts. As
described below,' 3 federal intellectual property law is primarily a response
to market imperfections caused by the "public goods" nature of
information. The UCC, on the other hand, is grounded in economic
considerations of minimizing the costs to contract and maximizing the
gains from contracting.'4
Because these respective statutory frameworks grapple with different
economic problems, their statutory remedies are also different. Intellectual
property law places more emphasis on the equitable remedy of the
injunction than the UCC, which emphasizes fixing damages by resorting to
market transactions or market indicators. Moreover, the intellectual

13. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779, 779-81
(1953) (noting that the uncertainty of pre-Code law increased costs and that legal traps under
pre-Code law offered chances for opportunistic behavior).
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property damages scheme might be termed "expectation-plus" 5 while the
UCC embodies an "expectation" based damages system. As discussed below,
in the more broadly theoretical terms of Calabresi and Melamed, in
achieving statutory goals, intellectual property law relies more on property
rules and the UCC more on liability rules.' 6 It is important to discuss not
merely the different policy goals of the laws generally, but also how their
remedial provisions help to implement those goals. This understanding
helps to clarify the issues involved when federal intellectual property law
and UCC remedies collide.

A. The Policies of FederalIntellectualProperty Law
The congressional power to enact comprehensive patent and
copyright systems is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution which states: "The Congress shall have the power... to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries; .... " Congress, in enacting the Patent 7 and
Copyright Acts" pursuant to the constitutional grant of power, was guided
primarily by the policy goal of enhancing the public welfare. More
specifically, Congress sought to encourage the production and
dissemination of information. 19 Left unregulated, the market is unlikely to
produce the optimal amount of information because it is difficult to
exclude nonpaying persons from benefiting from information once it is
marketed-the classic "public goods" problem. 0

15. However, the remedial scheme of federal intellectual property law historically has
been described as compensatory despite the fact that some of the statutes allow for treble
damages. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
16. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 85 Haxv. L. Rev. 1089, 1105-15 (1972) (proposing a
legal framework to use when deciding whether a broad property right to exclude through an
injunction or a liability rule requiring payment of damages is appropriate under particular
circumstances).
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).

18.

17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1101 (1996).

19. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
(The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' .... To this end, copyright assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.... )
(citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985)). See also,
Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and Policy 1-9 (1992) (providing an overview of the
evolution of thought regarding how patent laws benefit society from the view that "society's
benefit was the introduction of a new art or technology" to the perspective that the "primary
benefit... [is] the technological know-how behind the inventor's patent. The beneficiaries
on this view [are] ... not just the public at large, but instead others skilled in the technical
arts. ... ").
20. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 614-15
(National Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962) (discussing the unique problems
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For example, an author may invest a large amount of money in

developing software. 2' If, when the software were released into the market,
others could copy it for free, these copiers could, in turn, market the

software in competition with the author. Because these copiers would
expend money only to copy the software and not for research and

development, they could undercut the author's price.2 Elementary
principles of supply and demand would indicate that purchasers would buy
the lower-priced product.23 Thus, in the absence of some market
intervention, the original author who invested in the software's
development might never recoup his or her investment. Knowing this, the
author might never develop the software, instead investing his or her time

and energy in some other endeavor. The net result would be the
underproduction of information relative to the social optimum because of
the inability of the originator to recoup his or her investment. 24
Congress has focused on correcting this market imperfection with the
ultimate end of enhancing social welfare.25 The federal patent and

copyright laws represent one specific type of market intervention 2 -- the
grant of a legally enforceable property right to inventors and authors who
meet statutory standards.27 The particular rights granted under the

presented when information is the commodity); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and
Economics 108 (1988) (defining a public good as one "for which there is no rivalry in
consumption"). For a general economic perspective on copyright law, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989).
21. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 486 n.25 (citing authorities who estimate
expenditures of as much as $1 billion in developing just one software product).
22. Essentially, the secondcomer copiers would "free-ride" on the investment of the
original author. See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.3 (4th ed. 1992)
(explaining the benefits, burdens, and incentives involved in the free-rider problem).
23. This assumes that there is no product differentiation such that purchasers might
prefer the original author's work to that of the copiers. For a discussion of the basic
principles of supply and demand, see Paula M. Taffe, Imputing the Wealth Maximization Principle
to State Legislators, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 311 n.17 (1987) (citing Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 4-5 (3d ed. 1986)).
24. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 20, at 109 ("When public goods are supplied by private
means, the level of supply is usually deficient."). See generally Arrow, supra note 20, at 615-16
(discussing the allocative difficulties of information markets).
25. See supra note 19 (discussing how patent law benefits society because of the
introduction of new technology). See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.'").
26. The grant of exclusive rights is by no means the only manner by which the public
goods problem may be corrected. For example, government could choose to produce public
goods itself, use tax subsidies to encourage private production, or use some combination of
exclusive rights, government production, and tax subsidies to correct the incentive structure.
See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 20, at 48 (discussing policy means of correcting the public
goods problem).
27. Patents are granted for those inventions which are new, useful, nonobvious, and not
otherwise barred from patentability under the statute. The applications must comply with the
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Patene 8 and Copyright Acts vary, but their essence is the same: they
provide the rightholder with the ability to exclude others from undertaking

certain activities without a license. By providing rightholders with this
ability to exclude others, the Acts provide a means through which the
rightholder may recoup his or her investment. Thus, the grant of exclusive
rights is intended to overcome the public goods problem inherent in the
nature of inventive and creative activity.-"
requirements of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 111 (1994). Copyright inheres in
.original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," but does not
extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
28. "Every patent shall contain.., a grant to the patentee... of the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States .... " 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
29. The owner of a valid copyright
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following.
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).
30. However, by granting limited statutory monopolies in the form of exclusive rights to
correct one market imperfection-the public goods problem-the statutes necessarily
introduce their own market imperfections characteristic of monopolies. See Cooter & Ulen,
supra note 20, at 38-40 (describing market distortions associated with monopolies including
higher prices, lower output, externalities, and overinvestment in industries accorded
monopoly rights). In part to alleviate market distortions inherent in monopolies, both the
Patent and Copyright Acts contain limits on the exclusive rights granted. The most obvious of
these is the time limitations on the rights granted. Patents generally extend for 20 years from
the date the application was filed, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (1994), and copyrights generally for
the life of the author plus fifty years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1996). Further limitations on
copyright, including the fair use exemption, are found in § 102(b) and §§ 107-120 of the
Copyright Act. Common-law doctrines such as patent and copyright misuse also serve to limit
the scope of the exclusive rights granted. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 185-223 (1980) (reviewing the common-law doctrine of patent misuse and
congressional limitations on that doctrine as set forth in § 271(d) of the Patent Act);
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-75 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the copyright
misuse defense to defeat an infringement claim filed by a plaintiff whose license agreement
included a term preventing licensees from selling, producing, or developing any competing
products for 99 years). See also Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive
Software Licensing Restrictions:Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629, 64866 (1991) (analyzing misuse in the copyright context); Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing
Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 401, 410-48
(1994) (arguing against antitrust-based copyright misuse); Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The
Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1599, 1614-20 (1990) (arguing
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Trademark law, unlike patent and copyright, finds its constitutional
basis in the Commerce Clause.$' However, trademark law as embodied in
the Lanham Act is also based on a public goods theory, at least.in part. 2
Trademark law encourages businesses to invest in symbols to assist the
public in differentiating one producer's goods from those of another.33 A
particular symbol helps the consuming public to identify the manufacturer
that is the source of a product, thereby providing the public with a means
to identify the party responsible for any defect. Thus, the production of
such symbols is desirable from an economic perspective because it
encourages manufacturers to invest in quality control facilities.34
Moreover, by indicating a particular level of quality on which consumers
may rely, trademarks help consumers save the costs of seeking detailed
information about products.3 5 A trademark thus functions as a type of
"shorthand," indicating the source and quality of a good which bears a
particular mark. Trademark law itself functions not through a grant of
exclusive rights but by allowing registration of marks3 6 and prohibiting
others from using imitations of those marks in connection with their goods
when such imitation is likely to confuse the public. 7
Obviously, the patent and copyright grants of exclusive rights and the
trademark prohibition against imitation are only one part of the statutory
scheme designed to overcome the public goods problem and to encourage
investment in certain activities. The remedial provisions which accompany
each statute are an integral part of that system. If the statutes imposed no
sanctions for their breach, they would function merely as advice.ss
The equitable remedy of the injunction plays an important role under
all three statutes. 9 The injunction is the weapon primarily designed to

that the patent misuse doctrine is economically "irrational").
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051 (Law. Co-op. 1996)
(discussing trademarks used in commerce); Miles Lab., Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256, 257
(S.D. Cal. 1961) (-Congressional power to enact legislation to protect trade-marks is derived
from the commerce clause of the Constitution .. ").
32. Trademark law could also be viewed as consumer protection law as it seeks to prevent
consumer confusion. "The policies of consumer protection, property rights, economic
efficiency and universal concepts of justice underlie the law of trademarks." J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2.01[1] (3d ed. 1996).
33. See id."[T]rademark counterfeiting... would eventually destroy the incentive of
trademark owners to make the investments in quality control, promotion and other activities
necessary to establishing strong marks and brand names." Id.
34. See id.§ 2.01 [2] [a].
35. See id.§ 2.01 [2] [b].
36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1052 (1994) (allowing registration of marks by persons with
bona fide intentions to use the marks in commerce and placing certain limitations on what
marks are registrable, including a ban against registration of deceptive marks).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (providing for infringement liability).
38. SeeJeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General 14 (H.LA Hart ed., 1970) (discussing the
differences between law, exhortation, and advice).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) ("The several courts vested with jurisdiction ... shall
have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as

RETHINKING REMEDIES

1147

enforce the property right to exclude established under the Patent and
Copyright Acts and to protect the public from confusion under the
Lanham Act." The injunction, common in intellectual property cases,
may be
used at virtually any stage of the proceedings to stop infringe41
ment

From a theoretical perspective, the ready availability of an injunction
is consistent with a property rule regime as defined by Calabresi and
Melamed: "An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller."42 The intellectual property
statutes confer entitlements on rightholders, and third parties generally
have no license to encroach upon these entitlements. 43 To the extent they
do, the rightholder has a ready mechanism-the injunction-with which to

the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office ... ."); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1996) ("Any
court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may ... grant temporary and
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement
of a copyright."); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases
under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
40. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)
("Injunctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since
there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a defendant's continuing
infringement."); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1978). The court stated:
The right to exclude others from free use of an invention protected by a valid patent
does not differ from the right to exclude others from free use of one's automobile,
crops, or other items of personal property... That one human property right may
be challenged by trespass, another by theft, and another by infringement, does not
affect the fundamental indicium of all "property," i.e., the right to exclude others.
Id.
41. Both preliminary and permanent injunctions are common in intellectual property
cases. See generally McCarthy, supra note 32, § 30.03, at 30-36 ("[A]n injunction is the standard
remedy in unfair competition cases."); Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On
Copyright, § 14.06[A], at 14-96 (1995) (discussing preliminary injunctions, the authors note
that "their issuance is actually quite ordinary, even commonplace"); Robert Merges, Intellectual
Property Rights and BargainingBreakdoum: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75, 76-78
(1994) (noting that injunctions are routinely granted in patent cases and explaining the
rationale supporting such grant of injunctions). For a brief survey of cases which seek or
award permanent or preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases, see Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984); Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R. Inc., 88 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1996);
Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 89 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
800 Reservation, Inc.,1 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). This list is exemplary, not exhaustive, and
although most of the cases are recent, injunctions have been sought or awarded in intellectual
property cases since the adoption of the statutes.
42. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1092.
43. But see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (noting that the statutes also contain
liability rules).
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stop the encroachment." The injunction also effectively allows the
rightholder to determine the terms of any license agreement entered into
with the infringer. 5 The intellectual property statutes, then, fit within the
classic definition of a property rules system.
Using the Calabresi and Melamed model, Professor Merges has
explained why a property rights regime is appropriate in the case of
patents:
In [the Calabresi and Melamed] framework a property rule makes
sense for patents because: (1) there are only two parties to the
transaction, and they can easily identify each other; (2) the costs
of a transaction between the parties are otherwise low; and (3) a
court setting the terms of the exchange would have a difficult
time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the specialized nature of
the assets and the varied and complex business environments in
which the assets are deployed. Hence the parties are left to make
their own deal. 6
Similar rationale supports a property rights regime for trademark and
copyright. Generally, in both trademark and copyright licensing, there are
few parties to the transaction, transaction costs are low, and a court would
have difficulty calculating damages.
While the intellectual property statutes primarily implement a
property rights regime, there are cases in which the statutes rely instead on
liability rules. For example, the Copyright Act contains provisions for
compulsory licenses48 and an exemption from infringement for uses that
are deemed "fair" under the statute. 49 These liability rules were adopted
in part to account for the fact that there are instances in which transaction
costs may be so high that a property rights regime would prevent parties
from reaching an agreement. 5
In addition to the injunction, damages are also available under the
intellectual property statutes. Irrespective of whether an injunction is
sought or issued, courts are likely to award damages in a successful
infringement suit. The particular statutory damage provisions vary.5' For

44. See Merges, supra note 41, at 77.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 78. Merges also notes that strong property rules enforced by injunctions seem
to be working as the market for patent licenses is large and thriving, thus indicating parties'
willingness to engage in private transactions in their own interests. Id.
47. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that no adequate remedy at law exists to remedy continuing trademark infringement).
48. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1996) ("compulsory license for making and distributing
phonorecords"). In contrast, "[i]n general, [compulsory licenses] are available for patents
only as a remedy for violation of the antitrust laws." Robert P. Merges, Of Propery Rules, Coase,
and IntellrtualProperty, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2668 (1994) (footnote omitted).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
50. See WendyJ. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1601-02 (1982) (noting that it may be
appropriate to use fair use to excuse infringing conduct where transaction costs are too high
to allow parties to bargain).
51. The statutory damage provisions are somewhat complex. While the statutory language
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example, both the Copyright and Lanham Acts allow the aggrieved plaintiff
to recover its lost profits and, on an unjust enrichment theory, the
defendant's profits from the infringement.5 2 In contrast, the Patent Act
does not allow for recovery of the infringer's profits, but relies more on
compensating the rightholder through awarding the patent owner its own
lost profits or damages at an established royalty rate.53
A concern often expressed by courts and commentators in intellectual
property infringement cases is that if damages represent only what the
parties would have agreed to if they had negotiated a license prior to the
infringing conduct, they provide no disincentive for infringing
activity-instead, they effectively confer compulsory licensee status on the
infringer. 4 In starker theoretical terms, an ex post award of ex ante

is relatively straightforward, a number of issues may arise in litigation with respect to damage
calculations. This Article focuses not on an examination of those issues, but rather on a broad
view of the statutory provisions and their underlying policy rationales.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) ("When a violation of any right of the registrant of a
mark ... shall have been established.., the plaintiff shall be entitled.., to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action."); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1996) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual
damages suffered ... and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement
and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages."). For a description of the
theoretical underpinnings of monetary remedies in trademark and copyright cases, see
McCarthy, supra note 32, § 30.24[2] (noting that insufficient work has been done to
understand the public policy underpinnings of trademark remedies but stating that "[in
modem cases, courts have occasionally awarded monetary recovery on the rationales of
preventing unjust enrichment and/or deterrence of defendant and others"); Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra note 41, § 14.03, at 14-30 ("[Recovery of defendant's profits and plaintiffs lost
profits] makes any would-be infringer negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright...
[and, perhaps] some of the 'windfall' may actually be profit that the owner would have
obtained from [the infringer]"). See also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing
the deterrence goal of damages rules). The Copyright Act also contains provisions for
statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1996) ("The copyright owner may elect.., instead of
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages.").
53. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award ...
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty.....
"). Originally, claimants were entitled to the infringer's profits but concern over:
(i) costs of proof; (ii) delays inherent in the accounting procedures required to compute the
profits; and (iii) the difficulty of apportioning an infringer's profits to that attributable to use
of the patent at issue, led Congress to delete reference to the infringer's profits in a 1946
revision to the Patent Act. See genera/!y H.R. Rep. No. 79-1587, at 1 (1946) (revising the then
current statute to provide that damages should be ascertained on a compensatory basis). The
reasonable royalty is awarded in cases in which it is difficult to calculate the patentee's lost
profits or the established royalty. The reasonable royalty rate of the current statute is a
minimum measure of damages rather than a maximum. For an historical overview of the law's
development, see generally Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 20.02 (1995).
54. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th
Cir. 1978)
(The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated.., as the
equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly 'willing' patent owners and
licensees. That view would constitute a pretense that the infringement never
happened. It would also make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors
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royalties would move the intellectual property scheme away from a
property rules system and closer to a liability rules regime.
In part to address this problem, the statutes, in compensating the
rightholder, also attempt to include provisions that will function as
deterrents against infringement. For example, the Copyright Act includes
provisions categorizing certain infringements as criminal. 55 Both the
Lanham55 and Patent57 Acts provide for treble damages, albeit under the
rubric of compensation.
The equitable remedy of the injunction, supported by the legal
remedy of damages, provides a mechanism through which the rightholder
can be assured of compensation if a person wrongfully appropriates its
right. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the statutory remedies
effectively assure the rightholder that it may choose the parties with whom
it will-or will not-deal in licensing its rights.-s These enforcement
mechanisms thereby help to enhance the value of the initial property right.
By enhancing the value of the statutory property right, the enforcement
mechanisms help to achieve the statutory purpose of encouraging
investment in goods that would otherwise be public for the ultimate
benefit of society as a whole.
B. The Policies of the UCC
In contrast to federal intellectual property law, Article 2 of the UCC is
a relatively recent innovation59 promulgated by the National Conference
to impose a 'compulsory license' policy upon every patent owner.);
see aso McCarthy, supra note 32, § 30.27[4] [c], at 30-127
(The problem with using a reasonable royalty as a measure is that it in effect
compels plaintiff to license [its trademark] to defendant at a rate that defendant
proposed and plaintiff originally refused. Defendant is no worse off than if it had
been licensed in the first place, which is exactly what plaintiff refused to do.).
But see Merges, supra note 19, at 787 (questioning whether a patent infringer is really
indifferent between an ex post damages award and an ex ante license agreement given the
availability of injunctive relief).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1996) ("Criminal infringement.-Any person who infringes a
copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be
punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18.").
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) ("In assessing damages the court may enter
judgment... for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three
times such amount.... Such sum ... shall constitute compensation and not a penalty."); see
also McCarthy, supra note 32, § 30.28 [2] [b], at 30-133-36 (collecting judicial authority and
arguing that "the discretionary power to increase, while it must be 'compensation and not a
penalty,' is properly invoked not only to adjust for difficulties in proving amount, but also to
deter in egregious cases of infringement").
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.").
58. Cf Merges, supra note 41, at 77.
59. See supra note 5 for a summary of when the federal intellectual property statutes were
enacted. Note also that while the codification of commercial law is a relatively recent effort,
many of the rules contained therein existed at common law and, in the case of Sales, prior
statutory enactments including the Uniform Sales Act. The UCC codified certain parts of the
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of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in cooperation with
the American Law Institute (ALI) .r Additionally, the UCC is state law,
implemented individually by the legislative action of each state rather than
nationally at the federal level. 6'
At a very rudimentary level, the overall goals of the UCC are similar
to those of the intellectual property statutes. Both sets of law aim to benefit
society-intellectual property law by increasing the production and
availability of information; the UCC by encouraging parties to engage in
mutually beneficial exchanges. However, the means which intellectual
property law and the UCC use to implement this ultimate goal diverge.
Intellectual property law functions by a government grant of rights to
correct market imperfections. The UCC, rather than affirmatively granting
rights, sets forth a statutory framework within which private parties are free
to order their dealings as they see fit.
In the same way that Congress considered economic factors in
enacting the intellectual property statutes, the UCC drafters saw an
economic need for a statutory framework to facilitate commercial
contracting. This economic rationale may be inferred from the UCC's
statement of its statutory purposes set forth in § 1-102(2):
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
then existing law, changed some parts and introduced new features. "The Code was first
promulgated in the late 1950s and became the pervasive commercial law in this country in the
sixties." Alces & See, supra note 9, at 4. For excellent summaries of the history of the Code's
enactment by parties involved in the drafting process, see Robert Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798 (1958); Llewellyn, supra note 14;
Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Mod. L. Rev. 167 (1964);
William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 72 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1967). "Official texts of the UCC were promulgated in 1952,
1957, 1958, 1962, 1972 and 1978." Jonathan A. Eddy & Peter Winship, Commercial
Transactions 5 (1985). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and American Law Institute (ALI) continue to be active in proposing major
revisions to Code Articles. For example, Article 3 on Negotiable Instruments was extensively
revised in 1990. SeeJamesJ. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 461 (4th
ed. 1995). Articles 2 and 9 are currently being revised and Article 2B is being drafted for
addition to the UCC. See generally Fred H. Miller & Donald J. Rapson, Introduction; Status of
UCC Revisions in The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code 3-14 (1995)
(summarizing the activity of the states in enacting revised Articles and the status of efforts to
revise Articles 2 and 9); Raymond T. Nimmer, UCC Revision: Information Age in Contracts in The
Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code 19-26 (1995) (discussing the process
of drafting Article 2B).
60. See Braucher, supra note 59, at 799-804 (documenting in detail the activities of various
interest groups in drafting and revising the first version of the Code).
61. At least part of the UCC has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles and
Policies 2 (2d ed. 1991).
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parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.62
The drafters attempted to minimize costs of commercial transactions
in a number of ways. From a systemic perspective, they sought to decrease
reliance on the common law system of precedent that was both
cumbersome63 and lacked uniformity across the various jurisdictions.6
They planned to achieve this goal by replacing the common law system
with a uniform codification. This codification was to address the legal
62. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1996). However, note that these goals are to some extent
inconsistent with each other. Specifically, it is difficult to implement the flexibility desired
while also ensuring uniformity across jurisdictions. For example, that which is commercially
reasonable in Texas may not be so in Maine.
63. See William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodolog, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291,
296 (documenting the development of commercial law through the common law system of
precedent:
[T]he commercial law grew along lines which produced gaps and uncertainties in
spite of volumes of cases. Indeed, gaps and uncertainties seem to have been
generated in direct proportion to the number of published opinions, and this caused
a breakdown of our commercial case-law system toward the end of the nineteenth
century. A distinguished commercial lawyer, Professor Grant Gilmore, describes this
breakdown and its cause as follows:
When the number of printed cases becomes like the number of grains of
sand on the beach, a precedent-based-case-law system does not work and
cannot be made to work.. . In this country, it has been a long time since
even the best lawyer could make that claim, even in the narrowest field...
When it becomes possible to cite to a court not merely two or three prior
cases which bear a reasonable relationship to this case, but dozens of cases,
many of them so nearly identical on their facts as to be indistinguishable,
decided every which way-then what is the court to do?).
(citation omitted).
64. See id. at 293 (noting that allowing unguided judges to arrive at odd results was
"disastrous to the commercial community," frustrated the predictability essential to
commercial transactions and that the law's state of flux "began with nonuniform decisions
from the several jurisdictions").
65. See id. (contending that the UCG is a true code in the civil law sense). But see Homer
Kripke, The Principles Underlyingthe Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321,
331 (arguing that, in fact, the drafters had no intention of codifying the law in the
"continental sense"). Also note that the Code is not uniform in the sense that not all of its
parts have been adopted in all jurisdictions, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 2 (noting
Louisiana's failure to adopt Articles 2 and 6); and that not all states have adopted the version
promulgated by the NCCUSL without change, see Christian P. Callens, Comment, Louisiana
Civil Law and the Uniform Commercial Code: Interpreting the New Louisiana U.C.C.-Inspired Sales
Articles on Price,69 Tul. L. Rev. 1649, 1651 (1995) (noting that although Louisiana declined to
enact Article 2, it did revise its civil code to reflect Article 2 principles); Fred H. Miller, The
Revision of Article 2 of the Unform Commercial Code: Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C.
Article 2, 35 Win. & Mary L Rev. 1565, 1566-68 (1994) (discussing the difficulties encountered
in developing a uniform consumer law). In fact, the Code itself provides alternatives from
which states may choose. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-318 (1996) (providing states with three
alternatives from which to choose for defining the set of third party beneficiaries of express
and implied warranties). Finally, note that common law rules still apply to the extent not
displaced by the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1996) ("Unless displaced by the particular
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aspects of a commercial transaction from beginning to end, providing one
source of law with reasonably certain rules as the principle of decision.6
The drafters intended the increased certainty inherent in a codification of
this scope to help realize the desired cost-savings and to implement the
statutory goals of simplification, clarification, and uniformity.6 7
The drafters also sought to decrease costs to contracting parties by deemphasizing certain common law formalities in favor of recognizing
commercial realities.0 Article 2 is limited in scope to goods-tangible items
for which there is often a recognizable mass market in which technical and
formalistic contract rules were not always observed.6 9 Drawing on the legal
realist philosophy of Karl Llewellyn, the drafters believed that the law
could be, and in fact was, revealed by the practices of commercial parties
engaged in trading these goods.70 Thus, Article 2 often looks to
commercial practice in defining the content of a legal rule rather than to

provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions.").
66. See Hawkland, supra note 63, at 310-11 ("The Uniform Commercial Code meets [the]
test [of comprehensiveness]. It takes as its set the rules which are needed to build the basic
legal framework to control the flow of goods from producer to ultimate consumer.").
67. See genera, Llewellyn, supranote 14, at 783 ("[The Code] will eliminate something of
which [the businessman] isn't fully conscious--the unnecessary tax on his business that legal
uncertainty now imposes.").
68. See id.; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1 (1996) ("This section seeks to protect and make
effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the
technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."); Mentschikoff, supra note 59, at
172-75 (noting that the Sales Article was intended to make the law more accessible to
merchants, to simplify and clarify certain problems and to free some others from technicalities, e.g., by "eliminat[ing) the almost hopelessly technical law on when the seller can or
cannot sue for the price").
69. Goods are defined as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action." U.C.C. § 2105(1) (1996).
70. See William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 302-40 (1973)
(discussing the jurisprudence of the UCC and the role Karl Llewellyn and his legal realist
philosophy played in developing it); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 621, 626 (1975) (noting that "Article II frequently
speaks as though courts should discover the law merchant from a careful, disinterested
examination of custom and fact situations"); Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common
Law? - Recent American odifications, and their Impact onjudirialPracticeand the Law's Subsequent
Development, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1119, 1170 (noting that the Code "bid[s] the legalists to make
context-specific inquiries to infer the rules implicit in each situation") (citation omitted)). But
see Schnader, supra note 59, at 5 ("I can also state that what Professor Llewellyn believed
should be the articles of an ideal commercial code were not the articles as they emerged from
the crucible of debate when the Code was promulgated."). In Llewellyn's own words, "I am
ashamed of [the UCC] in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could make a little
better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that would have been good for the
law, but I was voted down." Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 784. However, out of all of the Articles
in the Code, Article 2 probably best reflects Llewellyn's philosophy. See Peter A. Alces, The
Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1299, 1299 (1994)
("Quite simply, Article 2 of the U.C.C., Sales, is, more than any other article of the Code,
Llewellyn's Llaw.") (citation omitted).
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the rules of common law contract.7' This statutory orientation helps to
realize the stated purpose of permitting the expansion of commercial
practice by reference to custom and trade usage.
In addition to minimizing costs by modifying some of the formalities
of common law and providing a uniform rule of decision, the UCC's
drafters intended to decrease costs by giving effect to the agreement of the
parties?7 The drafters built the UCC on a strong belief in freedom of

contract.7 3 The UCC is based on the assumption that the contracting
parties are best situated to allocate the gain from contracting, and that
courts should set that allocation aside only in rare circumstances. As a
result, Article 2 contains very few mandatory rules. In fact, it more closely
resembles a boilerplate contract, providing gap-filling provisions to
complete contractual terms that the parties might have left blank.7 4 These
provisions function as "default" rules around which the parties, with some
limitations, may contract. 75 Generally, in formulating these default rules,
71. For example, § 2-202 broadens the common law parol evidence rule, allowing the
introduction of evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade and course of performance to
explain or supplement even a fully integrated agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1996). This
willingness to admit oral evidence was intended to serve as a cost-saving device by importing
the commercial context of which both parties were aware into the contract. See Schwartz &
Scott, suptra note 61, at 50. The parties would no longer need to negotiate and memorialize
the assumptions common in the particular trade or deal, thus saving transaction costs. See id.;
see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 320 (1985)
(suggesting changes to the contractual interpretation process to accommodate new
contractual forms and to help correct the tendency of current interpretive rules to create
barriers to innovative contractual terms).
72. See Rosen, supra note 70, at 1222-23 (contending that Article 2 is based on an
"Agreement" theory with rules aimed toward ensuring enforcement of the parties'
agreement); see also U.C.C. §1-201(3) (1996) ("'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances. .. ").
73. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1996) ("Subsection (3) [of § 1-102] states affirmatively at
the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code: 'the effect' of its provisions
may be varied by 'agreement.'").
74. In contrast to the common law rule that all material terms must be agreed upon in
order for a contract to exist, under the Code, "[e]ven though one or more terms are left
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2204(3) (1996). The gap-filling provisions of Article 2 help to fill in the terms the parties left
open. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (1996) ("Open Price Term"); U.C.C. § 2-308 (1996) ("Absence
of Specified Place for Delivery"); U.C.C. § 2-309 (1996) ("Absence of Specific Time Provisions;
Notice of Termination"). Of course, "[tJ he more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it
is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement." U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. 1 (1996).
75. For limitations on contracting around the Code, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3):
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
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the drafters were guided by the proposition that to realize their goal of
minimizing costs, the rules should reflect the terms to which the parties
would have agreed had they actually bargained over the issue.76
These goals of freeing the law from certain vagaries of common law
and enforcing the parties' agreement are reflected in the UCC's remedial
provisions. 7 The UCC's general remedial philosophy is that of
expectation damages--" [to] put the aggrieved party... in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed."78 A good deal of
academic commentary supports the view that this expectancy measure of
damages is economically efficient because it effectively functions to move
resources to their highest valued uses while at the same time compensating
the aggrieved party-a "Pareto optimal" solution. 9 In keeping with the

See also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1996) (granting courts broad discretion to reform unconscionable
contracts or clauses).
76. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 21, 23 (stating that the Code should adopt
rules parties would have chosen had they bargained over an issue to save the parties
negotiation costs); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 90 (1989) (contending that the reasons why parties
leave gaps in contracts should inform the choice of a default rule and aid in identifying
situations in which selection of the rule to which the parties would not agree may be
appropriate); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 486
(1996) (discussing the economic support for selecting as default rules those which, if not
contracted around, maximize the expected value of the transaction); Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A TheoreticalSynthesis, 97 Yale UJ.353, 361 (1988) (stating that the
default rule should be the one which well-informed persons would have adopted if they had
bargained over the issue); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consen4 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 823-24 (1992) (identifying, evaluating and contributing
to the voluminous default rules literature).
77. For example, the Code relaxes the common law rule that damages be proved with
certainty: "The third purpose of subsection (1) [of § 1-106] is to reject any doctrine that
damages must be calculable with mathematical accuracy. Compensatory damages are at best
approximate: they have to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit,
but no more." U.C.C. § 1-106 cmt. 1 (1996). However, the Code does continue most of the
fundamental principles of common law regarding remedies, although its provision for the
buyer's right to cover is an innovation over the common law. See infra note 85. Thus the Code
did not create the problem discussed in this Article - it existed at common law contract as
well. However, the Code may have exacerbated the problem by introducing the cover remedy.
Additionally, the Code is the primary law governing remedies with respect to contracts for the
sale of goods. Therefore, this Article continues to focus on the UCC rather than common law
contract.
78. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1996). This ex post view of damages is the opposite of that taken
by the intellectual property statutes which focus on a restitution-putting the aggrieved party
in the same position as if no infringement had taken place-rather than an expectation
theory. See, e.g., Chisum, supranote 53, § 20.01, at 20-7:
The goal of the law of monetary relief for patent infringement is to provide full
compensation to the owner of a patent. The primary award should be the best
approximation of the amount necessary to restore the owner to the financial position
he would have enjoyed had the infringer not engaged in unauthorized acts in
violation of the owner's exclusive patent rights.
79. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1093-94 define Pareto optimality:
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to
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expectancy theory, the UCC does not support the award of
supercompensatory damages unless such damages are specifically
authorized under the UCC or other law. 0 Damages in excess of the
compensatory amount could lead to inefficient decisionmaking regarding
breach."'
The UCC remedial scheme is comprehensive in its implementation of
the expectancy measure of damages, offering both aggrieved sellers and
buyers a number of options from which to choose. 2 Of these options, the
two which present the most potential for conflict with the intellectual
property laws are the aggrieved seller's right to resell under § 2-706 and
the aggrieved buyer's right to cover under § 2-712. These particular
remedies may collide with intellectual property rights because they may
require the aggrieved party to exercise rights which it may no longer
that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further
change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they
could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before.
Prof. Merges has noted that damages for breach of contract are relatively easy to determine
and that awarding expectancy damages
encourages breach where the breaching party can both fully compensate the injured
party and enter into a substitute transaction with someone else who values the
breaching party's performance more highly. This is an efficient breach: a
compensatory remedy predicated on the ease of valuing the costs of breach and the
desirability (i.e., Pareto optimality) of having the breaching party's performance go
to the other party who values it most highly.
Merges, supranote 41, at 77. But see generally Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency
of Compensato7y Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1443, 1450 (1980) (contending
that compensatory damages, while efficient if transaction costs are zero, will not necessarily be
efficient where transaction costs are positive); Alan Schwartz, The CaseforSpecific Performance,
89 Yale LJ. 271, 278-98 (1979) (arguing that expectation damages may often be
undercompensatory and that specific performance should be awarded more often); Thomas S.
Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of ContractRemedie, 83 Mich.
L. Rev. 341, 366-71 (1984) (contending that courts should consider transaction costs in
deciding between specific performance and monetary damages); Edward Yorio, A Defense of
Equitable Defenses, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1201 (1990) (demonstrating the usefulness of equitable
doctrines like specific performance).
80. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1996) ("[N]either consequential or special nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law."). Thus, the
UCC does not contain provisions analogous to the treble damages sections of the Lanham
and Patent Acts. See supra notes 56-57.
81. See Posner, supra note 22, at 116 (noting that penalties deter both efficient and
inefficient breaches by making the cost of breach greater to the breacher than to the victim
and giving an incentive to the victim to provoke breach). But seegeneraUy Farber, supra note 79
(arguing that compensatory damages may in fact be less efficient than supercompensatory
ones). See also Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory ofEfficient Breach,
61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629, 662-63 (1988) (citing Farber and noting that remedies that may appear
overcompensatory may in fact be closer to compensatory than expectation damages).
82. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1996) (listing remedies available to aggrieved sellers including, as
appropriate, withholding or stopping delivery of the goods, canceling the contract, and
recovering damages or the price); U.C.C. §2-711 (1996) (listing remedies available to an
aggrieved buyer including, as appropriate, recovering the goods and/or damages).
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have.8
While the right to resell existed at common law," the right to cover
was a major UCC advance over the common law remedy of the contractmarket differential.s Simply put, it seemed that the best way to ensure
that the aggrieved seller or buyer would receive its expectancy would be to
allow the aggrieved party to continue to conduct its business through selfhelp recourse to the relevant market and then to award damages, if
appropriate. 6 Thus, Article 2 allows the aggrieved seller to resell the
goods in a commercially reasonable manner and receive damages
87
representing the difference between the contract and resale prices.
Similarly, Article 2 allows the aggrieved buyer to enter the market and
make a substitute-or "cover"-purchase, awarding the difference between
the cover and contract prices as damages.ss The aggrieved party under
Article 2 is not required to accept the contract-market differential as its
damages, although it may opt to do so. 6 Thus, in negotiating a contract

83. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (explaining why this might be the case).
84. See Mentschikoff, supra note 59, at 172 ("The Code simplifies, broadens, and clarifies
the seller's remedy of resale . .. ."); see also U.C.C. § 2-706 cmt. 1 (1996) ("The only condition
precedent to the seller's right of resale... is a breach.... Other meticulous conditions and
restrictions of the prior uniform statutory provision are disapproved by this Article .... ").
85. See White & Summers, supranote 59, § 7-6, at 369 ("The analogue to the buyer's right
to cover under 2-712 is the seller's right to resell under 2-706 .... Like the "cover" provision
for the buyer, 2-706 is an important Code innovation."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Responsive Model of ContractLaw, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1107, 1142-43 (1984) (discussing the reasons
for the resale and cover Code sections). While the resale remedy existed at common law and
in prior statutory enactments, the Code simplified and clarified it. Note also that some courts
did allow the cover remedy even at common law. See Moore & Mayfield, supranote 9, at 8 n.5.
86. Cf E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the DisgorgemetPrinciple
in Breach of Contract, 94 Yale LJ. 1339, 1370 (1985) (noting that, in theory, market remedies
like resale put the aggrieved party in its expectancy position); Robert E. Scott, The Casefor
Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 1155-60 (1990) (discussing
the efficiency of the expectancy remedy).
87. U.C.C. § 2-706(1)-(4) (1996) (setting forth the requirements for a complying resale
including its conduct in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner and notification to
the breaching buyer and setting damages as "the difference between the resale price and the
contract price together with any incidental damages... but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach").
88. U.C.C. § 2-712(1)-(2) (1996) (setting forth the requirements for an effective cover
including that the substitute purchase must be reasonable, made in good faith and without
unreasonable delay and setting damages as "the difference between the cost of cover and the
contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages... but less expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach").
89. However, the Code's treatment of seller's and buyer's remedies is not exactly
analogous. The aggrieved seller may choose to recover under either § 2-706 or § 2-708(1),
irrespective of whether or not it resells the goods. See, e.g., Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co.,
Ltd., 709 P.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Wash. 1985) (holding that where the aggrieved seller resells but
fails to comply with the requirements of § 2-706, the seller may still recover under § 2-708(1)).
Under § 2-708(1), contract-market damages are defined as "the difference between the
market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any
incidental damages... but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach." U.C.C.
§ 2-708(1) (1996). Section 2-706 and § 2-708(1) are likely to be approximately the same in
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governed by Article 2, the parties know that in the absence of a contrary
agreement, in the event of breach, the aggrieved party will be able to
choose to recover its resale or cover damages, the contract-market
differential or other damages as appropriate. The availability of this choice
helps to assure the contracting party at the time of negotiations that it will
be fully compensated in the event of breach.
This flexible remedial scheme seems to have been successful in
helping to achieve the UCC's goals of minimizing the costs to contract
while maximizing the parties' collective surplus. The expectancy principle
of damages allows for efficient breach so that resources will move to their
highest valued uses. Mitigation of damages principles which are built into
the UCC provisions and also incorporated from common law help to
minimize any loss from breach?0 Finally, contracts often do not provide
for specific remedies, but rather rely on the UCC default rules, including
the rights of resale and cover. This silence gives credence to the inference
that parties are satisfied with the UCC remedies?' This satisfaction
translates into lower transaction costs as the parties are able to rely on the
UCO remedial scheme rather than negotiating their own.9
The theoretical framework of the UCC is different from that of the

cases where the resale price and the market price at the time and place for tender (which is
assumed to be the relevant resale market) are the same. In cases in which they are not, the
seller may attempt to "game" its recovery as it can do better than its expectancy where the
resale price under § 2-706 exceeds the § 2-708(1) market price at the time and place of
tender. There is dispute among the commentators and courts as to whether the seller can
manipulate its choice of remedy to do better than its expectancy. The Code does not address
this issue. See White & Summers, supra note 59, § 7-7, at 376-83 (setting forth the statutory
history and arguing that despite legislative history to the contrary, sellers should be limited to
their expectancy). But see Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of ContractsRelating to the Sale of
Goode Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadnmp for Article Two, 73 Yale LJ. 199, 260-61
(1963) (making the opposite argument). In the same way, the buyer's cover damages will only
incidentally equal its contract-market differential damages. Under § 2-713(1), the buyer's
contract-market damages are defined as "the difference between the market price at the time
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and
consequential damages.., and less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach."
U.C.C. § 2-713 (1996). Thus, in cases in which the market price exceeds the cover price, the
buyer too could do better than its expectancy. However, unlike the case with the seller, the
Code comments specifically provide that the contract-market differential is available to the
buyer only "when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered." U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 5
(1996). But see Peters, supra at 260 (arguing for consistent rules for both buyers and sellers
and allowing buyers to choose either their cover or contract-market damages).
90. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-706 (1996) (requiring commercial reasonableness); § 2-712 (1996)
(prohibiting unreasonable delay); § 2-715(2) (a) (1996) ("Consequential damages resulting
from the seller's breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements, .. and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise ... ."). See also
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1996) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions."). Section 1-103 thus
incorporates common law mitigation principles.
91. Admittedly, it may just as well mean that the parties have no idea what remedies will
apply in the event of breach.
92. .Sesuprm note 76 (citing default rules literature).
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intellectual property statutes. In Calabresi and Melamed terms, the UCC
scheme sets up a liability rule system as both the seller and buyer may
purchase the right to breach by paying the applicable UCC damages.
This is in sharp contrast to the property rights system of intellectual
property law and can be explained by the differing nature of the
transactions covered by the UCG. As noted earlier, intellectual property
transactions often have only two readily identifiable parties, transaction
costs that are relatively low and damages that are difficult to value, all of
which justify a strong property rule to help realize the purposes of
encouraging inventive and creative activity. 4 In contrast, although
commercial transactions often involve only two parties-buyer and
seller-many transactions are faceless, making it both more difficult to
identify particular parties and expensive to contract on an individual basis.
Moreover, as a general rule, Article 2 goods are readily valued, making
damages easy to calculate and helping to justify a liability rule. 5
As intellectual property, despite its property rights orientation,
contains some liability rules, 6 the UCG, despite its liability rules bent,
contains some property rules. Where the buyer is unable to make itself
whole through resort to a market transaction, it may be entitled to specific
performance under § 2-716. 7 Similarly, where the seller is unable to resell
the goods, it may be entitled to recover the price under § 2-709."" These
"specific performance" remedies are rarely awarded because market
transactions should suffice to make the aggrieved party whole in the

93. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1092 ("Whenever someone may destroy the
initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement
is protected by a liability rule."); see also Merges, supra note 41, at 77 (explaining that because
it is normally easy to value a contracted-for exchange by resort to an objective market price,
courts are able to measure damages accurately, and a liability rule is therefore appropriate).
Perhaps the most extreme statement of the liability principle in contracts, made by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, substantially pre-dates Calabresi & Melamed. As stated:
If we look at the law as it would be regarded by one who had no scruples against
doing anything which he could do without incurring legal consequences, it is obvious
that the main consequence attached by the law to a contract is a greater or less
possibility of having to pay money.
Oliver Wendell Homes, The Common Law 247-48 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963); see also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L Rev. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to keep a
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,
-and nothing else.").
94. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
95. See Merges, supra note 41, at 77-78 ("Because it is relatively easy in most cases to
determine the value of the contracted-for exchange by reference to an objective market price,
it is possible for a court to accurately calculate the appropriate compensation for the injured
party.").
96. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (explaining the liability rules contained
in the intellectual property statutes).
97. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (describing the specific performance
remedy).
98. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (describing the seller's remedy for the
price).
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majority of circumstances.
Analyzed separately then, both federal intellectual property law and
the UCC represent reasoned responses to particular economic problems.
Those responses include the remedial provisions which are closely
connected to realizing the overall statutory goals. In a generic case that
addresses only intellectual property infringement or a UCC breach of
contract, there is no difficulty in giving effect to the remedial provisions of
the separate statutes and therefore no difficulty in effectuating the
respective statutory purposes. However, there are certain cases that
implicate both intellectual property infringement and a UCC breach of
contract action. The issue in such cases is whether a remedy may be
fashioned which will uphold the goals of both statutory schemes.
Therefore, this Article now turns to specific cases in which courts have
addressed that question.

II. THE PROBLEM-FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS V. THE
RIGHTS OF AGGRIEVED "SELLERS" AND "BUYERS" UNDER THE UCC

Under the Patent and Copyright Acts, if a person exercises one of the
rightholder's exclusive rights without a license or exceeds the scope of the
license it does have, that person is an infringer and may be enjoined from
further infringement and held liable for substantial damages.9 Likewise,
under the Lanham Act, a person who uses a registered mark in commerce
in a manner likely to cause confusion or who exceeds the scope of its
trademark license, is liable for infringement. 1°
Infringement liability seems, at first glance, to present no conflict with
ordinary contractual considerations. However, it is common for the
rightholder (licensor) to enter into license agreements with one or more
other parties (licensee(s)), authorizing the licensee to utilize one or more

99. Under the Patent Act, "Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (1994). Under the Copyright Act, "[alnyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996). See supra
notes 52-53 for a discussion of the remedies available under the Patent and Copyright Acts.
100. Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive shall be liable in a civil action by
the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. §1114(l) (1996).
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of its intellectual property rights in producing and/or marketing Article 2
goods. If the rightholder wrongfully terminates the license agreement or
otherwise breaches, leading to termination, under intellectual property law,
this termination ends the licensee's right to exercise the intellectual
property rights granted in the agreement.'0 ' Thus, the licensee may be
unable effectively to utilize its applicable UCC remedy of resale or cover
because the relevant remedy would require the licensee to exercise1 2rights
which it no longer has, and therefore may constitute infringement.
A. The Licensee as Aggrieved Seller
Patent, trademark, or copyright owners may choose to license some or
all of their rights to others for a number of reasons. 0 3 Perhaps chief
among these is maximization of profit. Often the owner of the intellectual
property right does not possess the manufacturing facilities to produce the
profit-maximizing level of output of the patented, trademarked or
copyrighted article. The rightholder will maximize the value of its federal
right by licensing third parties to manufacture the article under state
contract law.
These licenses vary in form but may be characterized for simplicity's
sake as involving either an outsourcing or a resale arrangement.- Under an
outsourcing arrangement, the licensee manufactures the product for resale
to the rightholder/licensor who in turn markets to the public.'M The

101. In the event of breach, the license is likely to terminate either of its own accord or at
the option of the nonbreaching party. This proposition is difficult to support since actual
license agreements are usually kept in confidence by the parties to the agreement. One
publicly available license agreement is the Open Software Foundation, Inc.'s (OSF) Master
Terms and Conditions which OSF uses to license its various software products. Under that
agreement which grants a copyright license, the licensee may terminate on 30 days notice to
the licensor. Master Terms and Conditions, Open Software Foundation, Inc. §7(a), at 3 (on
file with author). Upon termination, the license ceases. See id. § 7(b), at 3. See, e.g., 3
Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts, §
13.01-6, at 13-55 (2d ed. 1980) (providing for termination of a trademark license for a
number of reasons, including the right of both parties to terminate in the event of breach of
the other after notice and an opportunity to cure); 2 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Licensing
§ VIIIB, at VIIIB-13-14 (1996) (providing for termination of a patent license in the same
manner as the trademark license cited supra). Under intellectual property law, termination of
a license would end the licensee's rights under the agreement. The particular contract may
modify this intellectual property rule and provide for continuation of the license after
termination. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (discussing how parties may
account for termination of the license in their agreement).
102. Article 2 does not apply to licenses of its own accord. See supra note 11 (setting forth
Article 2's scope provision). Additionally in "mixed" contracts involving both Article 2 and
non-Article 2 transactions, the general rule has been to apply either Article 2 or the common
law depending on which transaction predominates. However, Article 2 has been applied to
license transactions by analogy and the NCCUSL is currently drafting an Article 2B specifically
to deal with licensing. Moreover, the courts have applied the UCC in the factual circumstances identified in the text. See infra Part II.A (reviewing the cases).
103. SeeJay Dratler, Jr., Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 1.03-04, at 1-19-34 (outlining
the business advantages and disadvantages of licensing).
104. For an example of this type of arrangement, see infra notes 13741 and accompanying
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licensor pays the licensee for the goods that it manufactures. This
arrangement is attractive when the licensor lacks sufficient productive
capacity to manufacture the article cost-effectively and expansion of that
capacity would be more expensive than contracting with another party to
manufacture the goods.
Alternatively, the licensor may authorize the licensee not only to
manufacture the product but also to resell it directly to customers. The
licensee then usually pays the licensor a royalty on each unit sold. This
arrangement eliminates the costs of the licensee's shipping the product
back to the licensor as well as the licensor's resale costs. However, the
licensor may lose some control over the quality of the finished product
unless it retains the right to conduct meaningful periodic inspections.,0 5
The ostensible collision between the remedial provisions of federal
intellectual property law and the UCC occurs when the licensor wrongfully
terminates the license agreement or otherwise breaches, leading to
termination. On breach by the licensor, the licensee in either an
outsourcing or resale arrangement is in the position of an aggrieved seller.
If intellectual property rights were not involved, the licensee-seller would
be free to resell the goods in the market as a self-help remedy. However,
because the termination of the license also terminates the right to sell the
goods, any resale could be considered infringing. Thus, federal intellectual
property law may function to limit the remedial options which would
otherwise be available to the aggrieved licensee.
1. Early caselaw
Cases addressing the relationship between UCC remedies and
infringement actions are relatively few in number. In 1963, the Second
Circuit, in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics Co.,'0 6 addressed the
question under the UCC's predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act. Platt &
Munk had licensed certain of its copyrights to Republic Graphics so that
Republic could produce educational toys for resale to Platt & Munk.'"7
Platt & Munk alleged that the goods Republic had delivered were defective
and refused to accept delivery of later shipments for the same reason.1 8
Republic sought to resell the goods that it had manufactured while Platt &
Munk brought suit seeking an injunction to stop the resale as well as
damages for copyright infringement on those goods that Republic had
already resold.'o In upholding the injunction, the court noted that
Republic might have had a contractual right to sell the goods, but stated
that affording the manufacturer the self-help remedy of resale under state

text (discussing the facts of the Mitsuboshi case).
105. Another way to express this idea is that the licensor will incur some costs in policing
its licensee/agent.
106. 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
107. See id. at 849.
108. See id. at 849-50.
109. See id.
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contract law would impair the federally granted rights of copyright in a
case in which the copyright owner alleges in good faith that its failure to
pay is justified."0
The Platt & Munk case is interesting primarily for its dicta suggesting
that in an appropriate case, the aggrieved manufacturer should be given
the right to resell:
We see no reason why the copyrighted character of the goods
should preclude these remedies when-and the qualification is
vital-the person for whom the goods were being made
unjustifiably declines to pay the price. In such event.., the
copyright owner has received "his reward;" if consent on his part
is needed, there would be at least as much basis for implying it,
or for holding him estopped to deny it .......
Platt & Munk was the first case to suggest that despite the existence
and termination of a license of federally created rights, the state law
remedy of resale may still be available to an aggrieved seller based on an
implied license theory.12 However, the Platt & Munk court was quite
vague about whether the aggrieved seller could exercise its resale remedy
without a prior adjudication of some type that its breach of contract claim
had merit. A requirement that the aggrieved licensee first obtain such an
adjudication would devalue the self-help nature of the resale remedy by
increasing the aggrieved party's costs and delaying its ultimate compensation.
In the trademark context, the court in Burberys (Wholesale) Limited v.
After Six Inc., "3 took a less generous view in considering whether an
aggrieved seller should be entitled to a resale remedy under an implied
license theory." 4 Burberrys had granted a trademark license to Abraham

110. See Plat & Munk, 315 F.2d at 855.
Ill. Id.
112. The doctrine of implied licenses is less well developed in copyright law than under
patent law. See infra note 139 (discussing implied patent licenses). Copyright licenses may be
implied in particular circumstances. See, e.g., IA.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776-77 (7th
Cir. 1996) (implying a license in favor of defendant construction companies for preliminary
drawings of an airport hanger where the architect prepared the drawings for a fixed fee, gave
the drawings to others intending that they be copied in connection with the building project,
the contract did not contemplate copyright, and the architect delivered the designs without
warning that he would consider further use to be copyright infringement); Effects Assocs. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-59 (9th Cir. 1990), rert.
denied, Danforth v. Cohen, 498 U.S. 1103
(1991) (implying a license to use special effects footage created at the defendant's request
and given to the defendant with the intent that the defendant copy and distribute it); Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff partner impliedly licensed
partnership to use a manuscript based on the plaintiff's pre-existing articles prepared as part
of partnership duties but limiting the scope of the license); American Inst. of Architects v.
Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (holding that where the plaintiff put a book
of forms on the general market, the plaintiff impliedly authorized private use of the forms by
book purchasers). See also MacLean Assocs. v. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769,
778-79 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding the scope of an implied license to be exceeded).
113. 471 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1984).
114. The grant of implied licenses is perhaps more restrictive under trademark than under
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Zion Corp. to manufacture 30,000 raincoats bearing the "Burberrys"
mark.' ' Zion manufactured 22,000 of the raincoats and shipped them to
Burberrys' retailers expecting Burberrys to pay for the coats." Because
of an unspecified dispute, Burberrys did not give cutting orders to Zion for
the remaining coats." 7 When Zion sought to manufacture and resell the
remaining coats, Burberrys sued for an injunction to prevent the
manufacture and resale, contending that any trademark license that had
existed had been canceled." 8
The court began with the premise that "continued use of a trademark
by the licensee after its expiration constitutes an infringement."" 9 It
implied that the goals of trademark law would be undermined by allowing
Zion to manufacture and resell the coats even under Burberrys'
specifications:
In trademark infringement cases the likelihood of confusion is
inherent in the infringement itself because the consumer would
be misled into believing that the trademark owner either
manufactured or authorized the use of the product. Thus, it is no
excuse that the item is manufactured with the same quality as the
trademark [sic] product for 2 plaintiff is still entitled to have its
reputation within its control.
The court rejected Zion's reliance on § 2-706 of the UCC, stating that "a
sale by the defendant could not be considered to be made in good faith
and to be commercially reasonable. Section 2-706 does not purport to
grant a trademark license .... ,,12 The court did not seem concerned
about Zion's receipt of its expectancy damages as it noted that Burberrys
was solvent and "[could] respond in money damages to any claim made by
[Zion]."'2 The court also stated that Zion might "resort to its other

either patent or copyright law. Trademark law imposes a quality control requirement on the
trademark owner that neither patent nor copyright requires. According to one commentator,
a trademark license may be implied where the licensor purports to grant rights that it does
not have but later acquires them. See Dratler, supra note 103, § 3.0418], at 3-66. McCarthy
seems to take a broader view than Dradter, contending that "[slome courts will imply both a
trademark license and a requirement for quality control from the dealings of the parties."
McCarthy, suli'a note 32, § 18.14[2], at 18-67. See generally Bill Blass, Ltd. v. Saz Corp., 751
F.2d 152, 154-56 (3d Cir. 1984) (refusing to imply a license where the original license had
expired even though the defendant would have to remove plaintiff's labels from clothing
prior to sale to avoid infringement); Birthright v. Birthright, 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1135 (D.NJ.
1993) (noting that a license may be implied where both parties understand the arrangement
but that such a license also may be terminable at will).
115. See Burberys, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Burbenys, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. IdL The court also noted that Zion would not be penalized for any failure to mitigate
its claim since the case was grounded in trademark infringement rather than contract law. hl.

RETHINKING REMEDIES

1165

remedies under the Uniform Commercial UCC."123
In contrast to Burbenys, in Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International
Corp.,'24 the Ninth Circuit held that there was no trademark infringement
under the California common law of trademark where a manufacturer
resold trademarked shirts without permission.'2 The Ninth Circuit ruled
in this manner even though a court had adjudicated the manufacturer/licensee to be in breach of the contract with the trademark owner. Monte
Carlo had contracted for Daewoo to manufacture men's shirts bearing
Monte Carlo's trademark.1 26 Monte Carlo rejected the shirts because they
would not be available for sale in time for the Christmas shopping
season. 27 Daewoo's American subsidiary resold the shirts bearing the
Monte Carlo trademark to discount retailers.12
In earlier proceedings, a jury had awarded Monte Carlo damages for
breach of contract and common law trademark infringement.'2' On
appeal, the court framed the issue as "whether the unauthorized sale of a
genuine, unaltered product initially manufactured for the plaintiff can
form the subject of a trademark claim." s0 The Monte Carlo court took a
different approach from the Burbenys court and held that the trademark
policy of preventing public confusion about the source of goods was not
implicated because the shirts sold by Daewoo "were the genuine product,
planned and sponsored by Monte Carlo and produced for it on contract
for future sale."1 3 ' The fact that Daewoo had breached its contract with
Monte Carlo, thus probably terminating its license to Monte Carlo's
trademark, did not factor in the court's decision on the trademark
issue.'32
The Burberrys and Monte Carlo cases are difficult to reconcile, as the
former suggests that the sale of even the genuine article after the
expiration of the trademark license constitutes infringement while the
latter suggests the opposite. This difference could be attributable to the
fact that Burberys was decided under the Lanham Act and Monte Carlo
under California's common law of trademark. In fact, the Ninth Circuit
has implied in a later case that Monte Carlo might have been decided
differently under the Lanham Act.'8 3

123. ld.
124. 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983).
125. See id. at 1056-58.
126. See id. at 1055.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d at 1056. However, the jury denied relief on the California
Unfair Practices Act claim, and the court directed a verdict for Daewoo on the Lanham Act
claim. See id.
130. Id. at 1057 n.3.
131. IdLat 1058.
132. However, the court did note that Daewoo's unauthorized sale might give rise to a
claim in contract but that Monte Carlo did not plead the case in that manner. Id. at 1057.
133. See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 620 (1993) ("In Monte Carlo,we were
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Trademark law under the Lanham Act is unsettled with respect to the
circumstances under which a licensed manufacturer may resell the goods
after a dispute." 4 The issue is perhaps more difficult under trademark
law than either patent or copyright law because of trademark's consumer
protection goal.' 35 In part to effectuate that goal, the Restatement
drafters have adopted the view that a manufacturer may not resell
trademarked goods even if the trademark owner wrongfully rejected
them. 6
Thus, the law with respect to the aggrieved seller in the context of
both copyright and trademark is unclear. There is some suggestion that
courts will imply a license to allow an aggrieved licensee to exercise its
UCC remedy of resale, but the scope of such a license as well as the
circumstances under which it would arise remain in doubt. The courts
have not yet addressed in detail the underlying policy considerations of

not construing the Lanham Act, rather we were applying California state common law. More
importantly, on the facts of that case we determined that the products in question were
genuine, both as to source and, most notably, as to quality."); see also Alces & See, supra note
9, at 492-94 (criticizing Monte Carlo, contending that the court misstated the test for trademark
infringement and stating that the goods were not genuine because they were not within the
control of Monte Carlo). However, the fact that the Monte Carlo court directed a verdict for
Daewoo on Monte Carlo's Lanham Act claim suggests that the result would have been the
same even under the Lanham Act.
134. These cases often involve "gray market goods." "Gray market goods are goods
produced abroad under a trademark that properly identifies the source of the goods in the
country of origin, but which are subsequently marketed in [the U.S.] without the consent of
the owner of the trademark in the United States." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§ 24 cmt. e (1995). For good discussions and reviews of cases in this area, see Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Lever Bros. v. United States and the Legality of Gray Market Imports: A New Shieldfor
United States Traidemark Owners in TransnationalMarkets, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 571 (1993);
Deborah B. Levine, Gray Skies for the Gray Market in the Wake of Lever Brothers v. United States,
24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 943 (1993); Shira R. Yoshor, Competing in the Shadouw Gray: Protecting
Domestic Trademark Holdersfrom Gray Marketeers Under the Lanham Act, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1363
(1992). The gray market goods cases involve breach by the licensee. This Article does not
advocate that the licensee be allowed to exercise its UCC remedies of resale or cover where
the licensee itself has breached.
135. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of trademark
law).
136.
Trademarked goods produced by a manufacturer under contract with the trademark
owner should not be considered genuine goods until sale of the goods under the
mark has been authorized by the trademark owner. Thus, if the trademark owner
rejects the goods, the manufacturer may not use the mark in reselling the goods to
others. This principle should apply without regard to whether the rejection
constitutes a breach of contract by the trademark owner.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 24, cmt. c (1995).
The Restatement drafters believed that this rule best protected consumers. Id. (acknowledging
that while a tenable argument exists for allowing resale by the aggrieved manufacturer, the
better policy is to protect consumers from the confuision that may result if the goods are sold
without the trademark owner's authorization). See also infra notes 285-91 and accompanying
text (acknowledging that because trademark has a consumer protection rationale, it may be
appropriate to award the price or specific performance).
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intellectual property and contract law in an attempt to formulate a logical,
consistent rule for contracting parties to consider when negotiating
agreements.
37
2. The most recent decision: McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc.

The Federal Circuit has injected some certainty into the debate at
least with respect to patent lawss by recognizing that where the licensor
has breached the contract, the licensee may have an implied license to
'
resell under the UCC.s
In McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., the court
addressed a case in which McCoy had licensed its patents and trademarks
on certain shrimp deveining knives to Mitsuboshi." ° Mitsuboshi was to
manufacture the shrimp knives and resell them to McCoy's marketing
agency, A.T.D. Marketing, Inc. (ATD)
.4' ATD refused to accept
conforming knives.
McCoy failed to pay for the knives or to instruct
Mitsuboshi as to their disposition.' 43 Mitsuboshi then resold the
knives.14 McCoy sued Mitsuboshi for patent and trademark infringement
and Mitsuboshi counterclaimed for breach of contract. 4 The jury

137. 67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1268 (1996).
138. Congress established the Federal Circuit in an attempt to bring some uniformity to
patent law decisions. "[T]he Federal Circuit follows the guidance of the regional circuits in all
but the substantive law fields assigned exclusively to it by Congress." Robert L. Harmon,
Patents and the Federal Circuit, § 15.2(b), at 585 (2d ed. 1991). The court considers the
grant of preliminary injunctions against patent infringement as one such substantive issue
reserved to it. See id. at 584 (noting that "assignor estoppel and separation of inequitable
conduct issues for nonjury trial" are considered substantive issues reserved to the Federal
Circuit). It is expected that lower courts will still look to the Federal Circuit for guidance even
in cases where the Federal Circuit's holding does not officially bind them. See id. at 585.
139. The law of implied licenses is fairly well developed under patent law. Implied patent
licenses have been granted in situations involving the sale of nonstaple components, the use
of purchased items in a patented process, authorized modifications to patented items, afteracquired patents and shop rights circumstances. See Dratier, supranote 103, § 3.04 [3]-[7], at 337 to 3-60 (explaining circumstances in which each situation is likely to arise and collecting
cases); Moore & Mayfield, supra note 9, at 4-5 (reviewing the fact patterns in which courts
have granted implied licenses). Courts have also found implied licenses in cases not fitting
comfortably within Dratler's paradigm. See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273
U.S. 236, 241 (1927) (holding that conduct may constitute consent and thereby a patent
license under circumstances in which AT&T assisted the U.S. in making patented audions and
furnished necessary information for such manufacture: "No formal granting of a license is
necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used by the owner of the patent, or any
conduct on his part exhibited to another from which that other may properly infer that the
owner consents to his use of the patent... constitutes a license ... ."); Wilder v. Kent, 15 F.
217, 219-220 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1883) (holding that the law may imply a license in the case of an
involuntary sale such as a sheriff's foreclosure sale).
140. Milsuboshi, 67 F.3d at 919.
141. See id.
142. See id. "The record contains no suggestion that the knives were defective." Id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Mitsuboshi, 67 F.3d at 919. Mitsuboshi also sued under both federal and Texas unfair
competition law and for recovery under Texas tort law. See id.
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returned a verdict against Mitsuboshi on the infringement
claims and in
4
Mitsuboshi's favor on the breach of contract claim.
The Federal Circuit, drawing on the Platt & Munk case and other
earlier implied license cases, held that Mitsuboshi had implied patent and
trademark licenses under the UCC to resell the knives. 47 The implied
licenses ostensibly arose from the long-term relationship between McCoy
and Mitsuboshi and from the former's wrongful refusal to pay or accept
the knives or to give reasonable instructions for their disposition.4
Moreover, clarifying an issue left in doubt by Platt & Munk, the court held
that "Mitsuboshi's right to resell under Texas law ... did not require a
prior adjudication that McCoy acted wrongfully in refusing to pay for the
knives."' 4 1 Without going into a detailed policy discussion, the court
noted that its implied license "does not offend the protection afforded
patent and trademark rights by federal law" as the enforcement of the
contract (license) is a matter of state contract law which is generally not
preempted by the federal intellectual property statutes."s
Currently then, the licensee as an aggrieved seller is faced with legal
uncertainty. Burberys and the Restatement suggest that the resale of a
trademarked product after breach by the licensor will constitute trademark
infringement while Mitsuboshi suggests otherwise. Platt & Munk and
Mitsuboshi taken together suggest that an aggrieved licensee/seller may
resell under copyright or patent law but the law is by no means certain.
This legal uncertainty makes the resale remedy less attractive for the
licensee than it otherwise would be because the licensee's damages for
breach of contract may be offset by infringement damages which it must
pay to the licensor.
B. The Licensee as Aggrieved Buyer
Depending on the form of the license agreement, the licensee may be
characterized in UCC jargon as a buyer rather than a seller. However, it is
much less common for the licensee to be in the position of an aggrieved
buyer than an aggrieved seller. The primary situation in which the licensee
would be in the position of an aggrieved buyer is when it requires the

146. See id. at 919-20 (noting that the jury also found against Mitsuboshi on the unfair
competition and tortious interference causes of action).
147. See id. at 920-22 (reviewing cases finding implied licenses in voluntary and involuntary
sales:
In the case of the self-help [re-]sale, the patent holder has defaulted on a
contractual obligation based on patented merchandise. Under commercial law, the
aggrieved seller can sell the merchandise and recover any losses from the breaching
buyer. Absent an implied license ... . patent holders could frustrate otherwise
available commercial remedies.).
148. See id. at 922.
149. i.
150. Mitsuboshi, 67 F.3d at 922 ("Intellectual property owners 'may contract as they
choose,' ... . but their intellectual property rights do not entitle them to escape the
consequences of dishonoring state contractual obligations.") (citation omitted).
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licensor's intellectual property rights to manufacture the protected product
for its own
internal use rather than for resale to the rightholder or the
5
public.'

1

In other cases, the buyer is just that-a buyer rather than a "true"
licensee. For example, resale arrangements often call for the licensor to
manufacture the product and market it to or through the buyer. In such
cases, the buyer is not a licensee.'52 It has not purchased a license to the
underlying intellectual property; rather, it has purchased the good which
embodies that intellectual property. However, in the event of breach by the
rightholder, the buyer may seek an implied license to exercise its right to
cover and to obtain exactly the goods for which it had contracted.
The judicial authority in these contexts is even more sparse than
where the licensee may be characterized as an aggrieved seller.
Additionally, the cases involve buyers rather than true licensees.'5 3 In
Finley v. Asphalt Paving Co., a 1934 Eighth Circuit case, Finley held patents
on certain machines used for paving 1 5 St. Louis adopted exclusive
specifications for paving requiring use of the Finley patents 5 of which
National Fin-Mix Corp. was the exclusive licensee.5 5 Asphalt Paving won
a paving bid relying on representations by National Fin-Mix that the
required machine would be delivered in time for it to complete its contract
with the city.'57 When National Fin-Mix did not deliver the machine,
Asphalt Paving contracted with another firm to construct the required
mixer.'5 This construction and the subsequent production of cement
required that the contractor and Asphalt Paving practice Finley's
patents. 5"9 Finley and National Fin-Mix sued Asphalt Paving for patent
infringement.'06

151. See, e.g., Finley v. Asphalt Paving Co., 69 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1934). For an analysis of
Finley, see infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
152. Thus, the cover cases are qualitatively different than the resale cases. In the resale
cases described above, the aggrieved seller was a true licensee. In the cover cases, the buyer is
often not a true licensee.
153. There is a quite tenable explanation for this. Intellectual property, as a public good,
has the property of inexhaustibility. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting the
public goods problem inherent in intellectual property). Therefore, unlike the resale cases
where the licensor may be buying goods back from the licensee and has an incentive to
breach if it finds a third party able to sell the goods to it at a lower price, the licensor has less
incentive to breach the agreement with its buyer/licensee even if a third party offers to pay
more for a license. The licensor will simply license the same information to the third party at
the higher rate because the supply of the information is not exhausted by the first license or
any subsequent license. This assumes, of course, that the licensor has not entered into an
exclusive agreement with a particular licensee.
154.

Finlk,, 69 F.2d at 498.

155.
156.
157.
158.

See
See
See
See

159.

See Finley, 69 F.2d. at 505.

id. at 504.
id. at 498.
id. at 501.
id. at 502.

160. See id. at 498.
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The Eighth Circuit could not look to the UCC for guidance in
fashioning a remedy because the UCC had not been promulgated at the
time of the court's decision. ' The court focused on patent law, and held
that the plaintiffs had granted Asphalt Paving a license under its patents in
a letter agreement:
When the plaintiff proposed in writing to furnish a mixer on
certain terms of royalty and deposit and the defendant, in writing,
agreed to the proposal and fixed the time of delivery, and the
plaintiff indicated its acceptance,62there was a completed contract
and an effective grant of license.
The court implied that if the letter agreement were insufficient, the
plaintiffs had impliedly licensed the patents under the circumstances.'
In 1983, the Federal Circuit more specifically, addressed the
relationship of patent law and the cover provisions of the UCC in H.M.
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.'" Stickle owned certain patents related to taco'
shell frying machines.'? Heublein acquired a number of Stickle fryers
and contracted with Stickle for the design of an automated production line
that included a high speed four-row fryer.'6 Later, Heublein planned to
build two additional production lines that would require additional
fryers. 6 7 Heublein offered to do the design work and have Stickle's
company, La Hacienda, or a third party manufacture the fryers.'t After
failing to enter into a satisfactory licensing agreement with La Hacienda,
Heublein contracted with Heat and Control, Inc. (HCI) for the
manufacture of the fryers, indemnifying HCI against infringement of

Stickle's patents.'
When Stickle's estate sued Heublein for patent infringement,
Heublein defended by asserting an implied license under the UCC's cover
provisions.170 Specifically, it alleged that La Hacienda had repudiated its
161. See supra note 59 (discussing the history of the UCC).
162. Finley, 69 F.2d at 504.
163. See id. at 505. "The conclusion of the trial court that the default of the plaintiff
corporation in furnishing the defendant a mixer as agreed by the terms of the contract gave
the defendant the right to procure it elsewhere and use the method, is fully sustained by the
authorities." Id.
164. 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
165. See id. at 1553-54.
166. See id. at 1554 (noting that Heublein acquired a number of fryers when it acquired
Zapata Foods, Inc., a taco shell production facility which used Stickle fryers. Heublein later
purchased additional fryers from Stickle.).
167. See id. at 1555.
168. See id. ("Heublein was prepared 'to do all the design work itself and reserve only the
fabrication of the fryers to La Hacienda, [or] ... to have a third party vendor supply the
fryers, for which Heublein would pay a royalty to La Hacienda.'").
169. See Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1556.
170. See id. (arguing in the alternative, Heublein asserted the invalidity of Stickle's patent
claims, "den[ied] that its fryers fell within the claims ....
[and] further asserted as affirmative
defenses that it had a valid license and/or that it had been induced to infringe with Stickle's
full knowledge and approval and that the plaintiffs were therefore estopped to accuse
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obligation under the original contract to supply additional flyers and that
7
this repudiation gave Heublein the right to cover to mitigate damages.' '
The court rejected the breach of contract claim, holding that the original
contract did not create an obligation on the part of La Hacienda to
furnish the fryers for the new production lines.'7 The court stated that
because "no anticipatory breach [had] occurred, Heublein had no right to
'cover' the contract and, thus, no implied license."1 7s This language
leaves the inference that had an anticipatory breach occurred, Heublein
would have been granted an implied license to cover.
Thus, the law with respect to the licensee as an aggrieved buyer is
perhaps even more unclear than where the licensee is an aggrieved seller.
There is no authority holding that an implied license will be granted to
allow an aggrieved licensee to exercise its right to cover either internally or
by authorizing a third party to produce the good at issue. Additionally, the
courts have failed to recognize the difference between a true licensee who
relied on an ability to exercise an intellectual property right and a mere
buyer who did not, and to consider whether this difference should affect
the remedial options available to the aggrieved party.
III. BARGAINING AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF CURRENT LAW

The relative scarcity of case law addressing the relationship of
intellectual property law and UCC remedies might be interpreted to
suggest that the issue has had and will continue to have little impact on
technology licensing. However, that conclusion is by no means compelled.
In fact, the legal rule on remedies affects the structure of negotiations.
This Section argues that the uncertainty of the current legal rule is
inefficient and may prevent technology licensing deals that would
otherwise be desirable from being concluded at all. Even in deals which are
concluded, the uncertainty of the rule introduces inefficiencies by
increasing bargaining costs. Therefore, this Article now turns to an analysis
of how the uncertainty of the legal rule affects the parties' negotiations.
A. Remedies Under the UCC
Any analysis of this issue must begin with an overview of UCC
remedies to understand their importance in the overall UCC scheme. The
remedial provisions of the UCC were designed in an effort to implement

Heublein of infringement").
171. See id. at 1558 ("Heublein first contends, as a basis for an implied license, that La
Hacienda repudiated the October 5, 1976 agreement to supply additional [fryers], thereby
giving Heublein the right to cover the contract through the use of a third party.").
172. See id. at 1558 ("In sum, there can be no breach of an agreement to provide certain
goods where the goods sought by the vendee are different from those covered by the
agreement.").
173. Id. at 1558-59. The court also held that the entire course of conduct of the parties did
not support the finding of an implied license based on consent. See id. at 1559; see also supra
note 139 (setting forth the implied license doctrine).
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the UCC's goals as set forth in § 1-102(2). 74 In particular, the UCG
drafters sought to provide maximum flexibility for aggrieved parties by
providing that remedies should be "liberally administered"'7 * and
"cumulative in nature." 76 Further, the drafters explicitly adopted the
expectation theory of damages in § 1-106(1) and through their
implementation of particular damage provisions, intending to encourage
efficient breach. 7 The following analysis considers in detail how the
UCO's damage rules help to encourage efficient breach and, more
specifically, why the remedies of resale and cover are important in helping
the UCC realize its goals.
1. Sellers' remedies
Consider a simple hypothetical example: Patentee owns a patent on
key components of a particular type of machine. Patentee does not have
sufficient productive capacity to maximize the profits that may be reaped
through exploitation of the patent. Patentee contracts with Licensee under
an agreement which authorizes Licensee to manufacture 15,000 units of
the machine, with Patentee to pay Licensee $100 per unit.'At the simplest
level, Patentee's expectation is to spend $1,500,000 and receive 15,000
machines while Licensee's expectation is to receive $1,500,000 in payment
from Patentee for the sale of 15,000 units.7 8 Under the UCC's remedial
philosophy then, in the event of a breach by Patentee, any remedy should
1
result in Licensee receiving $1,500,000 for the sale of 15,000 units. 7

Assume that Patentee finds another supplier willing to manufacture

the machines for $70 per unit. Assume further that Licensee has
completed manufacture of the 15,000 units"" and that Patentee breaches

after taking delivery of 7,500 units. Also assume that Licensee can resell the
remaining 7,500 units at a commercially reasonable price of $80 and that
the market price at the time and place of tender is $75.18' Because

174. See supra notes 59-98 and accompanying text (setting forth the Code's goals and
explaining how the drafters implemented them).

175.

U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1996).

176. U.C.C. § 2-703 cmt. 1 (1996) ("This Article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy
as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature ...
177. See supra notes 79-81 (describing efficient breach).
178. The Licensee also expects to make a profit from this deal. For example, if Licensee
spends $80 to produce each unit, it expects a net profit of $300,000 on completion of the
contract ($1,500,000 received from Patentee - 1,200,000 cost of production ($80/unit X
15,000 units)).
179. This assumes that Licensee does not seek to recover lost profits as its measure of
damages. See infra notes 192-95 (discussing when lost profits would be the appropriate
remedy).
180. Note that three scenarios are possible: (i) Licensor breaches before Licensee begins
production; (ii) Licensor breaches after Licensee has manufactured some but not all of the
machines; or (iii) Licensor breaches after Licensee has manufactured all of the machines. The
text primarily addresses the third scenario. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text
(describing likely remedies under the first two sets of circumstances).
181. The resale and market prices are often different. See supm note 89 (discussing the
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Licensee has already realized $750,000 of its expectancy from the 7,500
units for which Patentee has paid, an expectancy remedy should award
Licensee $750,000 on the sale of 7,500 units.
Ignoring the considerations of intellectual property infringement
liability that are introduced below, in the event of Patentee's breach, the
UCC would afford Licensee a number of remedies as an aggrieved
seller.'82 Intuitively, the most obvious way of assuring the seller its
expectancy is to order performance of the contract. If the contract is
performed, the licensor receives the goods and the licensee the contract
price. In this case, Patentee would have to pay Licensee the remaining
$750,000 and Licensee would deliver to Patentee the remaining 7,500
units.
This "specific performance" remedy-the aggrieved seller's action for
the price-is, however, rarely awarded because of efficiency considerations.
Often, if the buyer has breached the contract, it no longer wants the
goods. If the buyer were forced to pay the price and to accept the goods, it
would most likely scrap or resell them. However, between the buyer and
the seller, the seller is usually in a better position to maximize the amount
received on resale of the goods as the seller knows more about the
market.'83 In keeping with the principle of mitigation of damages then, §
2-709 of the UCC awards the price in circumstances in which, as a general
rule, the seller's advantage in resale is missing:'8' where the buyer has
accepted the goods,185 the goods have been lost or destroyed after their
risk of loss has passed to the buyer, or the seller is unable to resell the

possibility for the aggrieved seller to "game" its recovery). The market price is measured at a
snapshot in time and is thus unlikely to match the resale price, particularly in a rapidly
changing market. Additionally, the seller may be able to find an idiosyncratic buyer willing to
pay more than the market price. Finally, an obvious question would be why the second
supplier would manufacture and sell the machines to Patentee at $70 per unit when it could
sell them on the market for $75. The easy answer is that the supplier has no right to the
patent and therefore cannot manufacture the machine without entering into a deal with
Patentee. Additionally, the license with Patentee may offer other benefits--e.g., rights to
patented improvements-that make the $70 price worthwhile to the supplier.
182. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1996) (indexing seller's remedies).
183. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 356 ("A broad rationale for limiting an action
for the price is that the seller generally can resell the goods more efficiently because selling is
his business."). For a more detailed economic explanation, focusing on the costs of bribery
and negotiation, of the Code's reluctance to award the price, see Schwartz, supra note 79, at
286 n.48.
184. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 356 ("In sum, section 2-709(1)(a) applies
whenever the assumption that sellers have a superior ability to resell seems invalid.").
185. Acceptance is defined under the UCC:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite
of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection ... or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership....

U.C.C. § 2-606(1) (1996).
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goods at a reasonable price.'86
None of the cases addressing the remedies available to the licensee in
the position of an aggrieved seller have considered whether the price
should be awarded under § 2-709. At first glance, the factual situations in
which licensees are seeking a remedy do not seem to fit within the literal
wording of § 2-709.11 Thus, a party considering entering into a license
transaction is not likely to consider the price to be a meaningful remedy in
the event of breach. However, other UCC remedies-particularly those
requiring resort or reference to the market-will play a key role in the
negotiations.
Under § 2-706, (the seller's right to resell), Licensee resorts to the
market and sets its damages by reselling the goods. In this example,
Licensee's damages would be:
Contract Price

7,500 units x $100 = $750,000

- Resale Price

- 7,500 units x $80

+ Incidental Expenses
-

Expenses Saved

Damages

= 600,000

+ Incidental Expenses
- Expenses Saved
$150,000 + Incidentals - Expenses Saved

Thus, § 2-706 awards Licensee its expectancy as Licensee sold 7,500 units
to Patentee for $750,000 and sold 7,500 units on the market for $750,000
after the award of damages ($600,000 resale price + 150,000 damages).
Licensee ends the transaction having manufactured and sold 15,000 units
for $1,500,000-exactly where it expected to be when it entered into the
contract.

88

Moreover, Patentee has done better than its expectancy.

186. SeeU.C.C. § 2-709(1) (1996).
187. But see infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text (discussing the possible extension of
§ 2-709(1)(b) to licensors). A strong case may be made that the price should be awarded in
many of these transactions.
188. However, note that Licensee's receipt of its expectancy depends on its full recovery of
incidental and other damages. See Craswell, supra note 81, at 637 ("[Elxpectation damages as
awarded in law often fall short of a truly compensatory measure due to the exclusion of such
items as attorneys' fees, unmeasurable subjective losses, and 'unforeseeable' damages.")
(footnote omitted). As Professor Schwartz notes in the case of the aggrieved buyer.
In many cases damages actually are undercompensatory. Although promisees are
entitled to incidental damages, such damages are difficult to monetize. They consist
primarily of the costs of finding and making a second deal, which generally involve
the expenditure of time rather than cash; attaching a dollar value to such
opportunity costs is quite difficult.
Schwartz, supra note 79, at 276 (footnote omitted). This concern also applies to aggrieved
sellers. Moreover, unlike buyers, sellers are not explicitly awarded consequential damages
under the Code which leads to a further risk of undercompensation. See generally White &
Summers, supra note 59, § 7-16, at 287-90 (contending that the omission of recovery of
consequential damages for sellers may be attributable to the drafters' failure to consider the
possibility of sellers incurring such damage).
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Rather than paying $1,500,000 for 15,000 machines, it has paid $1,425,000
($750,00 of the contract price to Licensee + 150,000 in damages to
Licensee + 525,000 to the new supplier (7500 units X $70/unit)). Section
2-706 thus encourages efficient breach-Licensee has received its
expectancy and Patentee is better off.'80 If the resale were held to be
infringing, Licensee's damages would be offset by those which it must pay
Patentee for infringement. In such a case, Licensee would receive
something less than its expectancy while Patentee would fare even better
than it already is. The UCC's goal of encouraging efficient breach would
be undermined because damages which undercompensate the aggrieved
party encourage excessive amounts of breach.
Under § 2-708(1), Licensee may seek instead to refer to market
indicators and recover the contract-market differential. In this case,
Licensee would then receive:

Contract Price
- Market Price
+ Incidentals
- Expenses Saved

7,500 units x $100 = $750,000
- 7,500 units x $75 = 562,500
+ Incidentals
- Expenses Saved

Damages

$187,500 + Incidentals - Expenses
Saved 90

Again, Licensee should eventually receive its expectancy-$750,000 on the
sales to Patentee plus $750,000 under the damages award of § 2-708(1)
((Resale at $562,500) + 187,500 damages = $750,000) on the sale of 15,000
units.'9' Also, again, this rule encourages efficient breach as Licensee has
received its expectancy and Patentee has done better. Rather than paying
$1,500,000 for 15,000 units, Patentee has paid $1,462,500 ($750,000 of the
contract price to Licensee + 187,500 in damages to Licensee + 525,000 to

189. There is some dispute as to whether allowing the breaching party to capture all of the
gains from breach is appropriate. For example, some would argue that the $75,000 gain from
breach ($1,500,000 - 1,425,000) should be allocated between the breaching and aggrieved
parties.
190. These incidental expenses and expenses saved are unlikely to equal those under § 2706. In fact, they are likely to be larger simply because of the lapse of time. A quick resale
often avoids the accrual of incidental damages.
191. This assumes that Licensee resells at the market price of $75 per unit. If Licensee
resells at $80 but recovers under § 2-708(1), then it may actually do better than its
expectancy: $750,000 on the sales to Patentee plus $787,500 from the damages award under §
2-708(1) (Resale at $600,000 + 187,500 damages), leaving Licensee with a total of $1,537,500
on the sale of 15,000 units, $37,500 better off than its $1,500,000 expectancy. The Code does
not explicitly state whether sellers should be allowed to "game" their recovery and receive
more than their expectancy. See supra note 89. If the Licensee eventually resells for less than
the market price, it will do worse than its expectancy under § 2-708(1) and may seek instead
to recover under § 2-706 or its lost profits under § 2-708(2).
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the new supplier (7,500 units X $70/unit)). However, note that Licensee
only receives its expectancy under § 2-708(1) if it in fact resells the goods.
Thus, § 2-708(1) may present the same problem for the licensee in the
position of an aggrieved seller as § 2-706: Licensee can only be made whole
if it infringes. However, in fact, it will not be made whole. The damages it
would have to pay for infringement offset the contractual award of
damages, leaving Licensee worse off than its expectancy position and
Patentee even better off. The UCC's goal of encouraging efficient breach
would again be undermined.
There is somewhat more leeway for a court to fashion damages under

§ 2-708(1) than under § 2-706. The market price or the amount of
incidental damages in the § 2-708(1) damages calculation could be
adjusted to account for the fact that the resale would be infringing. This
would bring the § 2-708(1) contract-market differential damages much
closer to a § 2-709 action for the price.
Another alternative for an aggrieved seller would be to sue for its lost
profits. Under § 2-708(2):
If the measure of damages provided in [§ 2-708] (1) is inadequate
to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done then the measure of damages is the profit (including
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full
performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article.. . due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale. 92
Under a conventional application of this provision, in this hypothetical,
lost profits would be the appropriate measure of damages if the licensee
had not yet begun production. 93 If the licensee had manufactured some
of the machines before the licensor breached, and on breach made a
commercially reasonable decision to stop manufacture, 94 it would be
entitled to lost profits on those machines which were never completed. 9 5

192. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1996).
193. See White & Summers, supra note 59, §7-10, at 264-66 (describing when the award of
lost profits is appropriate, including when the seller has never acquired the goods and makes
a commercially reasonable decision not to acquire them after hearing of the breach - the
"jobber" seller). The licensee who has not yet purchased the materials to begin production is
like White's & Summers' jobber.
194.
Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may in the exercise of
reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective
realization either complete the manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the
contract or cease manufacture and resell for scrap or salvage value or proceed in any
other reasonable manner.
U.C.C. § 2-704(2) (1996).
195. See White & Summers, supra note 59, § 7-10, at 264-66 (describing the "components"
seller as one who has the components required for the manufacture of the product on hand
when the buyer breaches and stating: "[t]he drafters indicated a second situation as
appropriate for the profit remedy of 2-708, namely the situation where a seller-manufacturer,.. learns of the buyer's breach while in the process of manufacturing the contract
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The licensee might also be able to make an argument for lost profits
based on its inability to be made whole by recovering the contract-market
damages under § 2-708(1). As demonstrated above, the contract-market
measure of damages gives the seller its expectancy if the seller actually
resells the goods. However, if a resale would be infringing, then the § 2708(1) remedy may not be adequate to give the seller its expectancy and
an award of lost profits might be appropriate.
The licensee in the position of an aggrieved seller must consider that
any § 2-706 resale may be infringing, relegating it to § 2-708 to seek
damages or § 2-709 to sue for the price. Under § 2-708, the contractmarket differential may be available. If the contract-market differential will
not put the licensee in its expectancy position, lost profits may be awarded
under § 2-708(2). The price is unlikely to be available under current law.
If both § 2-706 and § 2-708 give an aggrieved seller its expectancy,
then a logical assumption would be that sellers are indifferent regarding
under which section they recover. In fact, a closer look at the two sections
demonstrates that there may be many situations in which sellers would
prefer to recover under § 2-706. This preference springs from the fact that
in some circumstances, there is a greater risk of undercompensation under
§ 2-708 than under § 2-706.
Under § 2-706, the aggrieved seller will probably maximize its
compensation for breach if there is a risk of the buyer's insolvency, in part
because § 2-706 is a self-help remedy. The aggrieved seller may minimize
costs by immediate resort to the market. Also, the aggrieved seller may
never incur litigation costs including attorneys' fees. Admittedly however, if
the aggrieved seller proceeds under § 2-706 and the amount received on
resale is less than the contract price, it may have to bring suit to collect
damages. Additionally, under both § 2-706 and § 2-708(1), the seller may
never have to commence litigation because, if the figures are reasonably
certain, both parties would be better off settling for the UCC damages and
avoiding the litigation expenses of a suit. 96
However, where the matter of breach or other issues is in dispute,
litigation is likely. In that event, expenses in a § 2-706 suit are generally
likely to be less than those involved in either a § 2-708(1) or § 2-708(2)
suit. In a § 2-706 suit, the contract and resale prices are objectively
verifiable while the § 2-708(1) market price may be difficult and costly to
ascertain. 97 Under § 2-708(2), proving lost profits may be quite expensive

goods") (footnote omitted).
196. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 354 (noting that because Code rules may be
easily applied, "they importantly affect settlement negotiations").
197. See id. at 363 ("By reselling under section 2-706, the seller can fix his damages with
certainty and avoid the proof difficulties of establishing the market price under section 2708(1)."). This contention is less persuasive for standard, mass marketed goods since the
market price should be readily available. See Schwartz, supra note 79, at 285 ("The difference
between the contract and market prices is often easily determined, and breaching sellers have
an incentive to pay it promptly so as not to have their extra profit consumed by lawyers'
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as it requires detailed information regarding the aggrieved seller's cost
structure."' To the extent that the proof under § 2-706 is less expensive
to establish than under § 2-708, litigation costs, including attorneys' fees,
should be reduced.'" Moreover, courts do not uniformly award
prejudgment interest, 2°° which may result in the seller's being deprived
of the time value of money unless it may immediately resort to the market
to resell the goods under § 2-706. Courts also do not uniformly award
attorneys' fees. 20 ' As an aggregate matter then, aggrieved sellers seem
likely to prefer the § 2-706 remedy as it is more likely fully to compensate
them for the breach.0 2
Although there is an absence of empirical evidence proving that
sellers prefer to recover under § 2-706, the importance of the resale
remedy should not be overlooked. Put simply, the availability of a number
of remedial options, including resale, helps to decrease the seller's risk by
increasing the probability that the seller will recover its expectancy in the
event of breach. The seller's ability to obtain its expectancy is a key factor
in encouraging efficient breaches. To the extent that the law's uncertainty
reduces the number of remedial options available to an aggrieved party,
the UCC's goals are frustrated.
2. Buyers' remedies
For each seller's remedy, there is a counterpart for the buyer. Thus, a
consideration of a similar hypothetical helps to illustrate the buyer's
remedies. For example, assume that Licensee is engaged in a business
which utilizes a particular type of machine. Licensee seeks to practice the
patent owned by Patentee in the hypothetical above to produce 15,000 of
the patented machines for its own internal use. Licensee agrees to pay
Patentee a lump sum of $2,250,000 in exchange for the right to use
Patentee's patent in producing the machines.0 5 Under the UCC's

fees."). Additionally, there are procedural hurdles under § 2-706 which may prove costly. For
example, the resale must be commercially reasonable and the breaching buyer is generally
entitled to notification of the resale. See U.C.C. §§ 2-706(1) & 2-706(3) (1996).
198. See White & Summers, supra note 59, § 7-13, at 276 (noting the difficulty of the
seller's establishing its profit, including what a reasonable amount of overhead would be:
"ft]he seller must establish 'the profit (including a reasonable overhead).' This phrase is
likely to be the scene of bloody battles between the accountants of the various parties. One
can expect no unanimity among accountants about what is overhead and what is not or about
how the overhead is to be allocated to the seller's various contracts").
199. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 363.
200. See Farber, supra note 79, at 1450 (noting that foregone interest usually cannot be
recovered as part of a breach of contract damages award).
201. See id. (noting that attorneys' fees are not normally awarded as part of a breach of
contract damages award).
202. It is difficult to make any categorical statement about sellers' preferences as litigation
over remedies is relatively infrequent, in part because of the certainty of Code rules. See
Schwartz & Scott, suptra note 61, at 354.
203. Licensee might agree to do this because, for example, the use of the machines may
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expectation theory of damages, in the event of Patentee's breach, any
remedy should result in Licensee paying $2,250,000 for 15,000
machines. °
Assume that Patentee finds another buyer-Buyer 2-who is willing to
pay $2,750,000 for the right to practice the patent for the same number of
machines but only if Patentee agrees to license Buyer 2 exclusively. Assume
further that Licensee can purchase reasonable substitutes for the machines
for $2,400,00025s and that the market price at the time and place at
which Licensee learned of the breach was $2,450,000.20r
As in the case set forth above discussing the remedies of an aggrieved
seller, there is an intuitively obvious means of awarding Licensee its
expectancy. As a court can award the aggrieved seller the price under
certain circumstances, so too can a court award the aggrieved buyer
specific performance. °7 If the contract were specifically performed,
Licensee would receive a license to practice the patent and pay Patentee
the $2,250,000 contract price. Licensee could then produce the 15,000
machines.
As in the case of the seller's remedy of the price, the buyer's remedy
of specific performance is rarely awarded, again because of efficiency
considerations. Generally, the seller will perform the contract unless
performance becomes more expensive than breach. 203 The buyer can be

allow it to realize production cost savings. For example, assume that Licensee produces a
product it resells to consumers. It uses certain machines in the production of this product. By
replacing its current machines with the patented machines, Licensee can save $3,000,000 in
production costs. It would therefore be worthwhile for Licensee to license the patent:
$3,000,000 anticipated cost savings - 2,250,000 paid to Patentee = $750,000 net benefit to
Licensee.
204. For simplification, this assumes that Licensee does not incur additional costs beyond
the license fee in manufacturing the machines.
205. An obvious question is why would Buyer 2 pay Patentee more than the cover or
market price? Buyer 2 may be willing to pay more because it will be the exclusive licensee to
the particular patent. Also, the "reasonable" substitutes which Licensee purchases are just
that-substitutes which are not identical to the machines it expected to obtain. Licensee will
seek to recover the difference in value as part of its damages. The more unique the patented
machine, the more likely it is that the prices would diverge. Finally, the point would still hold
if the market and cover prices were higher than the price offered by Buyer 2.
206. In the same way that the resale and market prices are often different, see supra note
181, the cover and market prices are often different. See infra note 216 (discussing possibility
for aggrieved buyer to "game" its recovery). The market price is measured at a snapshot in
time and is thus unlikely to match the cover price, particularly in a rapidly changing market.
Additionally, the buyer may be able to find a bargain or have to pay more than market
because it needs the goods quickly.
207. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1996).
208. Stated another way, while there are generally any number of reasons for a seller to
breach the contract, the most likely one is that the seller has found someone willing to pay
more for the goods as in the hypothetical here. Because of the inexhaustibility of intellectual
property rights, the licensor generally would not have to breach the original license
agreement unless that agreement were exclusive or the new licensee demands an exclusive
arrangement as in the textual hypothetical.
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made whole by resort to the market, either by making a cover purchase
and receiving damages or by receiving the contract-market differential as a
damage measurement. However, where the goods are "unique" in the
sense that no market for them is readily ascertainable, the courts may lack
sufficient information to be able to calculate an accurate amount of
damages. Under such circumstances, there is a risk that the buyer will
be undercompensated.2 10 Thus, under § 2-716 of the UCC, the buyer may
be awarded specific performance "where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances."2 '
None of the cases addressing the remedies available to the aggrieved
buyer have considered whether specific performance should be awarded
under § 2-716. In intellectual property cases, the buyer's argument for
specific performance under the literal wording of the statute is more
obvious than the seller's argument for the price. The fact that a good is
patented, copyrighted, or trademarked may be some indicia of
uniqueness.2 1 2 However, there is a lack of authority which supports an
award of specific performance merely by virtue of the fact that the good is
protected by an intellectual property right.
As is the case with aggrieved sellers, the primary remedial framework
on which the buyer relies in entering into a contract with the seller is the
market damages available under the UCC. Under § 2-712 of the UCC,
Licensee resorts to the market and sets its damages by making a cover
purchase. In this hypothetical, damages would be calculated as follows:

Cost of Cover
- Contract Price
+ Incidentals
+ Consequential
- Expenses Saved

$2,400,000
- 2,250,000
+ Incidentals
+ Consequentials
- Expenses Saved

Damages

$150,000 + Incidentals + Consequentials Expenses Saved

Thus, after breach, Licensee receives its expectancy - 15,000 machines for
$2,250,000 ($2,400,000 cover purchase price - 150,000 damages). 2' s

209. Sre Schwartz, supra note 79, at 273-75 (noting the availability of specific performance
in cases such as those involving land and long-term requirements contracts).
210. Sre iU ("Courts will grant specific performance when they perceive that damages will
be inadequate compensation.").
211. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1996). According to the Code comments, other proper circumstances
may include "[olutput and requirements contracts involving a particular or peculiarly
available source or market," also "inability to cover is strong evidence of 'other proper
circumstances.'" U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 2 (1996).
212. Sre infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (discussing the feasibility of the specific
performance option).
213. Two things are noteworthy about the buyers' damages generally. The first is that as is
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Moreover, Patentee has done better than its expectancy. Rather than
receiving $2,250,000 for a license to build 15,000 machines, Patentee has
received $2,600,000 ($2,750,000 price received on the license to the
second buyer - 150,000 damages paid to Licensee) .24 This is an example
of the efficient breach' that the UCC remedial rules were designed to
encourage.
There is an obvious difference between Licensee's exercising its right
to cover in this hypothetical and Licensee's exercising its right to resell in
the former hypothetical. When Licensee was the aggrieved seller entering
the market to resell the patented item, it was doing an act which would be
unauthorized absent a patent license. In contrast, here, the Licensee was
able to go into the market and buy reasonable substitute machines. This
remedy does not require that Licensee actually practice the patent and
therefore presents no conflict with intellectual property law.
Any collision between § 2-712 and intellectual property remedies
should occur relatively infrequently. In this example, Licensee will require
a license from Patentee in the event of Patentee's breach only if Licensee
seeks to cover internally by manufacturing the machines itself or if
Licensee opts to cover by licensing the patent to a third party to
manufacture the machines. In the former case, internal cover in this
context is really synonymous with specific performance. The availability of
that remedy is likely to be assessed under § 2-716 rather than § 2-712. The
latter case would present the only set of circumstances in which Licensee
would require a patent license in order to exercise its cover remedy.
Assuming that Licensee paid a third party $2,400,000 to manufacture the
machines, the cover damages would be the same as those calculated above.
However, the Licensee would do worse than its expectancy if it had to
offset its cover damages by the damages it would have to pay Patentee for
infringing its intellectual property rights. Again, the UCC's goal of
encouraging efficient breach would be undermined by the award of
undercompensatory damages.
To the extent Licensee does not cover, it is entitled to damages under
§ 2-713 of the UCC.2 15 Under that section, Licensee's damages would be:

the case with sellers, buyers may be undercompensated if incidental damages are difficult to
prove. See supra note 188 (noting the difficulties of proving incidental damages). Second,
buyers, unlike sellers, are explicitly afforded consequential damages tinder the Code. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-712(2), 2-718(1), 2-715(2) (1996). There is also some risk of undercompensation
if consequential damages are difficult to prove.
214. This assumes that Patentee has made the decision that it is better off exclusively
licensing Buyer 2 than licensing Licensee and others.
215. Note the distinction between the seller's and buyer's options. The seller may choose
to sue for the § 2-708(1) contract-market differential even if it has conducted a § 2-706 resale.
However, the buyer may site for the § 2-713 contract-market differential only to the extent it
has not covered. See supra note 89.
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Market Price
- Contract Price
+ Incidentals
+ Consequentials
Expenses Saved

$2,450,000
- 2,250,000
+ Incidentals
+ Consequentials
- Expenses Saved

Damages

$200,000 + Incidentals + Consequentials Expenses Saved

Again, the buyer should be made whole. It receives damages sufficient to
allow the purchase of the machinery at a $2,250,000 out of pocket
expenditure ($2,450,000 market purchase price - $200,000 damages). 1 6
Under § 2-713, Patentee does better than its expectancy. Instead of
receiving $2,250,000 for a license to build 15,000 machines, it receives
$2,550,000 ($2,750,000 price to the second buyer - 200,000 damages paid
to Licensee). 2 However, note that Licensee only receives its expectancy
under § 2-713 if it in fact covers. Thus, § 2-713 may present the same
problem for the licensee in the position of an aggrieved buyer as § 2-712:
it can only be made whole if it infringes and, in fact, it will not be made
whole because the infringement damages which Licensee would have to
pay would offset the contractual award of damages. Again, the UCC's goal
of encouraging efficient breach is frustrated.
However, § 2-713 itself may account for this problem. The buyer is
entitled to consequential damages under that section. Consequential
damages are defined to include "any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of
contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
2,' The seller/licensor would know at the time
prevented by cover ....
of contracting of the buyer/licensee's inability to cover without infringing
the seller's intellectual property rights. Thus, under § 2-713, the damages
calculation could be adjusted to reflect this fact.
The licensee in the position of an aggrieved buyer must consider that
any § 2-712 resale may be infringing, relegating it to § 2-713 to seek
damages or § 2-716 to sue for specific performance. Under § 2-713, the

216. In cases in which the market price exceeds the price at which the buyer makes a
substitute purchase, the buyer theoretically could do better than its expectancy. For example,
if it purchased a substitute for $2,400,000, it would spend only $2,200,000 ($2,400,000 $200,000 received in damages) for the machine it expected would cost $2,250,000. However,
this "expectancy plus" remedy is barred by the Code because the buyer cannot recover
contract-market damages where it has covered. See supranote 89. This may help to account for
the large volume of cases discussing whether a particular purchase is a "cover" purchase. See
Annotation, Wat Constitutes "Cover" Upon Breach by Seller Under UCC § 2-712(1), 79 A.L.R. 4th
844, 865-90 (1990) (collecting a large number of cases on what constitutes cover).
217. See supra note 79 (discussing efficient breach).
218. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (a) (1996).
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contract-market differential may be available. If the contract-market
differential will not put the licensee in its expectancy position, the licensee
will seek specific performance which may be awarded if the goods are
"unique."
A similar question to that presented in the context of the licensee as
seller now arises. 2 ' 9 If §§ 2-712, 2-713 and 2-716 all give an aggrieved
buyer its expectancy, the logical assumption is that buyers are indifferent
regarding under which section they recover. However, there seems to be a
greater risk of undercompensation under § 2-713. Section 2-712, like § 2706, is a self-help remedy which helps to protect the aggrieved buyer
against the seller's insolvency, to minimize incidental and consequential
damages, and to decrease the chance that the aggrieved buyer will incur
litigation costs including attorneys' fees.n ° Even if litigation were to
occur, expenses are likely to be lower under § 2-712 than either § 2-713 or
§ 2-716.22
Again, however, other circumstances may indicate that these factors
do not compel the conclusion that aggrieved buyers would always-or even
more often than not-prefer to cover than to recover under another UCC
section. As is the case with the seller, the availability of a number of
remedial options decreases the buyer's risk by increasing the probability
that it will recover its expectancy in the event of breach. The buyer's ability
to obtain its expectancy is a key factor in encouraging efficient breaches.
To the extent that one or more remedies become infeasible because of the
law's uncertainty, the UCC's goals are frustrated.
The difference between the account of the licensee as an aggrieved
seller and that of the licensee as the aggrieved buyer is one of volume. The
sheer number of transactions involving licensees as aggrieved sellers is
likely to be much larger than that involving licensees as aggrieved buyers.
When the licensee is in the position of an aggrieved seller, it generally is in
possession of the goods covered by the intellectual property right and
needs a license in order to be able to resell them. When the licensee is in
the position of an aggrieved buyer, it requires a license only if it cannot
make a reasonable substitute purchase. If it cannot, then the remedy which
it seeks is usually specific performance rather than cover. Cover would be
implicated only if the licensee sought to have a third party manufacture
the good.

219. See supra Part III.A.1.
220. Of course, if the cover price exceeds the contract price, the buyer may have to sue
for damages.
221. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supranote 61, at 403 (noting that in cases where the seller
repudiates the contract, the contract-market differential damages are difficult to calculate
because of the difficulty in establishing market price at the time and place buyer learned of
breach). The covering buyer's proof entails merely proving the contract and cover prices
which are objectively verifiable.
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3. The impact of intellectual property law on the aggrieved party's remedial

options under the UCC
The comprehensive UCC remedial scheme is designed to encourage
the parties to make efficient choices by providing aggrieved parties with
their expectancy. An integral part of that scheme is to allow the particular
aggrieved party to choose whether to make itself whole through a market
transaction, an award of damages representing the contract-market
differential, lost profits, or specific performance. In many cases, the most
efficient solution and the one preferred by the aggrieved party is resort to
a market transaction of resale or cover.
Thus, whether by its own terms or because it is uncertain, any legal
rule which would make these remedies relatively unattractive should be
closely scrutinized. If parties believe that they risk receiving less than their
expectancy by exercising their rights of cover or resale, those remedies may
effectively be removed from the parties' remedial options. Removal of one
of the remedial options designed to ensure an aggrieved party its
expectancy changes the bargaining structure of negotiations by increasing
the probability that an aggrieved party will be undercompensated in the
event of breach. In turn, this may lead to inefficient breaches.
In fact, as seen in the Burberys case, intellectual property law has been
used as an instrument effectively to remove the option of the aggrieved
party's resorting to a market transaction to fix damages. 2 If the licensor
wrongfully terminates the agreement or otherwise breaches, leading to
termination of the underlying intellectual property license, then the
aggrieved licensee (who may, depending on the circumstances, be in the
position of an aggrieved seller or buyer) will be subject to the threat of
infringement liability if it chooses to fix its damages by resort to its resale
or cover remedies.
In the usual case, the mere threat of intellectual property damages,
which are often quite large, effectively eliminates the options of resale or
cover for the aggrieved party. For example, in Mitsuboshi, the trial court
awarded $89,337 in breach of contract damages to Mitsuboshi and $2.6
million to the breachingparty for infringement and commission of various
business torts based on the nonbreaching party's resale of patented and
trademarked items.2
When the aggrieved party runs the risk of being held liable for
222. See supra notes 113-123 and accompanying text.
223. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1268 (1996). The award reflected damages for patent and trademark infringement,
tortious interference with prospective business relations, unfair competition, punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. See id. While the court did not
specifically indicate the amount of damages allotted to each element of recovery, even if the
infringement damages represented only 1/3 of the judgment, they would still substantially
exceed damages for breach of contract. Moreover, all of the damages reflect the lower court's
belief that the resale of the knives under the UCC was wrongful.
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infringement in the event of its resale or cover, those remedies become
unattractive. This is particularly true for patent and copyright licensees. A
trademark licensee does have the ability to avoid infringement damages
simply by removing the trademark before it resells. However, removing the
trademark will increase the amount of the licensee's incidental damages.
There remains a risk of undercompensation for such a licensee if its
incidental damages are difficult to prove or are undervalued.
The Mitsuboshi case suggests that, in fact, intellectual property law will
not function to limit the availability of UCC remedies. 4 However, this
law is neither uniform nor certain. The uncertainty of the legal rule, then,
is likely to impact the negotiating strategies of the parties both prior to
entering into the contract and after breach occurs. This uncertainty is
likely to create inefficiencies in their conduct at both stages, suggesting the
need for a change in or at least a clarification of existing law.
B. The Effect of the Collision Between Intellectual Property Law and the
UCC on BargainingBehavior
In the language of entitlements, the collision between intellectual
property and UCC remedies might be conceptualized as follows: in the
event of the licensor's breach, does the licensor have an entitlement under
the intellectual property laws to stop the licensee from exercising its
relevant UCC remedy of resale or cover and recover damages for
infringement, or does the licensee have a UCC entitlement to resell or
cover free of infringement liability? The answer to this question helps to
define the scope of the licensor's property right and thereby define the
boundary line between intellectual property and contract.
Of course, according to Professor Coase, in a world of no transaction
costs, the parties will bargain to the efficient allocation of entitlements,
irrespective of the legal rule.m Thus, the initial assignment of an
entitlement is immaterial because it will eventually wind up with the party
.2
Therefore, if transaction
who values it most-the efficient solutionY
costs were zero, it would not matter whether the licensee began
negotiations with its UCC rights to resell or cover in the event of the
licensor's breach intact, or whether they began the negotiations without
such rights. The end result would be efficient. Moreover, as already noted,
one reason why property rules make sense in the context of the intellectual
property statutes is because of the low transaction costs that characterize

224. See supraPart IIA2.
225. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 8 (1960);
supra note 81, at 632 (noting that the same proposition does not hold
negotiations: "If ex ante negotiations are costless, then any legal rule
consistent with efficiency.... [H]owever, the same conclusion does not
costlessness of ex post negotiations").
226. See supra note 79 (defining efficiency as state in which a resource
hands of those who value it most).

see also Craswell,
true for ex post
may indeed be
follow from the
winds up in the
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intellectual property licensing.2 7 This suggests that the assignment of the
entitlement at issue should not be a major concern for the law because
transaction costs are low enough to enable the parties to negotiate to the
efficient solution.
Even if this were the case, an entitlement with the licensee to resell or
cover free of infringement liability as a default rule may still be
appropriate. Such a rule would help to define the scope of the intellectual
property right and thereby the intellectual property-contract boundary.
Besides low transaction costs, one of the justifications for a strong property
right in intellectual property transactions was that it allowed the licensor to
choose with whom it would deal.2s2 Where the licensor has already
entered into a license agreement, it has chosen with whom to deal and, in
breaching, is seeking to escape that bargain by using its property right as a
club. Its property right should not extend that far.
Also, as formerly explained, the law has always recognized the fact
that there are times when even intellectual property licensing transactions
have been characterized by high transaction costs.2 Those instances are
likely to increase as new technologies evolve.230 Moreover, there are
transaction costs involved in any negotiation23'-it is the magnitude of
those costs that matters. If the initial entitlement is so assigned that the
parties must incur the transaction costs of negotiating to place a particular
remedial option in the hands of the party who values it the most, contracts
which otherwise might be efficient may never be concluded. In such
circumstances, transaction costs that would not be incurred under a default
rule which initially placed the entitlement with the party who valued it
most must now be expended. The addition of these transaction costs may
227. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
228. See supfra note 58 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 50.
230. For example, the vast quantity of information required for today's multimedia
software packages presents daunting problems for potential licensors. See Marshall Leaffer,
Protecting Authors' Rights in a Digital Age, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1995); Michael D. Scott,
FrontierIssues: Pi!talls in Developing and Marketing Multimedia Products, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.1. 413, 414 (1995). However, note that technology may itself decrease transaction costs. For
example, a number of commentators have noted that transaction costs on the Internet are
quite low. See, eg., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspac 1996 U. Chi. Legal F.
217, 236-37 (noting that transaction costs are generally lower for cyberspace transactions); Eric
Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could be
Unimportant on the Internet 12 Berk. Tech. LJ. 15, 22 (1997) ("[W]hile transaction costs are
not zero, the Internet has significantly reduced tranaction costs.").
231. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1096 ("[Nio one makes an assumption of
no transaction costs in practice."); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
"Coaseanism," 99 Yale LJ. 611, 612-16 (1989) (noting that transaction costs abound and
dividing such costs into functional categories); Ian R. MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. Rev. 947, 957-58 (listing the litany of costs which may be called
transaction costs); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1661, 167276 (1989) (noting that determining the significance of transaction costs in a given market is a
critical inquiry and identifying two approaches to defining transaction costs).
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cause the negotiations to fail as the costs of concluding the deal may now
exceed the gains from trade. 32
Therefore, the Coase theorem's primary importance is not in
asserting that the legal assignment of entitlements doesn't matter but in
emphasizing that "we pay attention to transaction costs in assigning initial
rights to make it more likely that the rights will wind up in the hands of
the party, with the best use for them. " s23 The following argues that the
practical implementation of the Coase theorem argues for allowing the
to enter the negotiations with their rights to resell and
seller and buyer
4
cover intact.3
This assignment of entitlements should be the default rule because it
reflects the assignment which the parties would have bargained to had they
negotiated the issue.355 Of course, it is always speculative to attempt to
divine the rule to which the parties would have agreed. For this reason,
legislative drafters often use surrogates such as usage of trade in defining
the parties' intent.2s In the absence of relevant usage of trade, drafters
may look to the efficient economic solution as a proxy for the parties'
intent and may also choose to introduce more abstract notions such as
justice and faimess. 3 7
In the context which the Article addresses, there is little evidence of
relevant usage of trade.2m Thus, aggregate economic efficiency may stand
as a proxy for the rule to which the parties would have agreed. As already
noted, maintenance of the entire menu of UCO remedial options is
efficient.2s9 The following section supports this proposition by demonstrating that holding one of the remedial options to be infringing
introduces inefficiencies into the bargaining process. Finally, this Article
argues that maintaining the entire set of remedial options is also fair.

232. Cf Ellickson, supra note 231, at 613 ("[1]n situations where law actually governs
entitlements, the conferral of a legal entitlement may affect the allocation of resources...
when the transaction costs of transferring the entitlement to a person who values it more
highly would exceed the gains from that trade.").
233. Merges, supranote 41, at 82 (footnote omitted).
234. See Moore & Mayfield, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that if the burden were placed on
the buyer to negotiate a license to cover, the UCC's goal of reducing transaction costs by
providing default provisions would be frustrated).
235. See supra note 76 (citing default rules literature which contends that default rules
should reflect the legal rule to which the parties would have agreed).
236. See Barnett, supra note 76, at 906-07 (noting the importance of express terms, course
of dealing, and usage of trade in understanding the parties' intents).
237. See id. at 907-10 (stating that in the absence of market choices demonstrating the
parties' intent, moral theory and economic analysis may provide guidance as a reflection of
the common sense of the particular community involved).
238. The terms of most license agreements are not a matter of public record. The
evidence of the form books and other published contracts is inconclusive. See infra note 268
(discussing boilerplate forms).
239. See supra Part III.A (demonstrating how UCC remedies attempt to ensure efficient
breach).
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1. Pre-breachconsiderations
The relative scarcity of caselaw addressing UCC remedies is somewhat
remarkable. As Judge Friendly stated in 1963 in Platt & Munk:
Whether the lack of precedent [in these cases] is attributable to
an unusually high standard of dealing, and of solvency, on the
part of [intellectual property] proprietors and those manufacturing for them, or to an unaccustomed and unexpressed previous
consensus in the profession as to the applicable rule of law, it is
none the less remarkable.2'5
The relative scarcity of caselaw might also imply that informed licensees
are accounting for this risk in their contracts. Two other categories of
licensees include: (i) those who are uninformed about the uncertainty of
the legal rule and believe that their UCC remedies will apply on
breach;241' and (ii) those who know of the uncertainty of the legal rule
but consider the probability of its becoming an issue too low to justify the
cost of negotiating to clarify it in the contract. A closer analysis of all three
of these contexts suggests that all of them argue for clarifying the law to
adopt expressly a default rule allowing resale or cover without liability for
infringement.
(a) The uninformed licensee
If the licensee is uninformed about the uncertainty of the law and
assumes that its full panoply of UCC remedies will be available in the event
of the licensor's breach, it will pay too much for the rights to which it is
licensed. The price that the licensee is willing to pay is influenced by a
number of factors, including the nature and availability of remedies in the
event of breach. 42 As discussed above, the objective of UCC remedies is
to put the aggrieved party in the position it would have been in had the
other party performed. The uninformed licensee thus contracts assuming it
will be made whole in the event of breach. It would not pay as much for a
contract under which it may or may not be made whole-one in which it
may have to surrender its right to resale or cover to avoid damages for
infringement.
240. Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics'Co., 315 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
241. This, of course, assumes that the parties know of the UCC remedies but not of the
risk that they may be effectively negated by liability for intellectual property infringement.
This assumption is not farfetched as the licensee in the position of an aggrieved seller is
engaged in manufacturing and selling goods on a daily basis and is therefore likely to know
the governing law-the UCC. In comparison to its main business of marketing goods, the
licensee is likely to enter into licensing transactions on a much smaller, more infrequent scale.
Of course, to the extent a license is required to manufacture the licensee's key product, the
licensee would have an incentive to be informed about the relevant intellectual property rules.
242. See Craswell, supra note 81, at 630-31 (noting that remedial options influence a
number of contracting decisions including 'whether to agree to the contract in the first place,
and at what price").

RETHINKING REMEDIES

1189

The licensee's valuation of the contract is thus incorrect. In such a
case, it would be appropriate to set the default rule in favor of the one
which the uninformed party would desire-which in this context is also the
rule which is efficient and thus desirable to both parties. 43 Setting the
rule in this manner helps to correct problems of informational
asymmetry. 244 The licensor who wishes the option of preventing the
licensee's resale or cover must disclose that desire during the contractual
negotiations. This disclosure will both inform the licensee of the relevant
law and help it more accurately to assess the desirability of entering into
the contract under either the default rule or that which the licensor
desires.
Additionally, setting the default rule to allow the licensee to resell or
cover without incurring infringement liability would enhance the efficiency
of the decision to breach. The uncertainty of current law may in fact
encourage inefficient breach by providing an overincentive for the licensor
to terminate the contract wrongfully or otherwise breach it in hopes of
receiving a windfall.24 As already noted, damages for infringement will
often outweigh damages for breach of contract, leaving the aggrieved
licensee substantially undercompensated. Undercompensatory damages
lead to inefficient
decisionmaking regarding breach by encouraging too
2
much of it. 4
Of course, most intellectual property licensees are probably not
uninformed for at least two reasons. First, many are large commercial
companies with competent counsel. Second, even if a licensee begins as an
uninformed party, if it is held liable for infringement damages just once in
the event of the licensor's breach, it will become informed quite quickly.
Thus, most licensing transactions are likely to involve informed licensees.
(b) The informed licensee who does not bargain over remedies
The informed licensee may quite rationally decide not to raise the
issue of clarifying the legal uncertainty regarding remedies. It may simply
decide to take its chances in the event of the licensor's breach. This
strategy would be rational if the cost of negotiating the issue exceeded the
benefit.2 4 Moreover, it presents the paradigmatic example cited as

243. Cf Barnett, supra note 76, at 888-89 (arguing that it makes sense to adopt a default
rule that reflects the expectation of the rationally ignorant party to create incentives for the
rationally informed party to express its preferences). Since the licensee may enter into only
one such transaction, it may be uninformed relative to the licensor who enters into many
license agreements.
244. See id.
245. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (setting forth damages awarded in the
Mitsuboshi case at the trial level).
246. There are ample statements to this effect in the law and economics literature. For
one example, see Farber, supra note 79, at 1445 (arguing that where contracts are
underenforced, "a number of economically undesirable results [occur], including an excessive
level of breach").
247. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 76, at 92 & n.30 (explaining that one reason for
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justifying the adoption of a default legal rule which reflects what the
parties would have bargained to had they negotiated the issue.2 8 Thus, in
this context as well, it would be appropriate to clarify the law by making
the default rule one that allows the aggrieved licensee to resell or cover
without liability for infringement.
While the strategy of not negotiating over this particular issue may be
rational for individual transactors, its aggregate effect on the judicial
system may be substantial and undesirable. By opting to defer the issue of
remedy, the parties are effectively imposing the costs of fashioning an
adequate remedy on the courts.2 9 Yet the parties would seem to be in a
better position to select a remedy, as they are more familiar with the
markets for both the underlying intellectual property right and the
particular good which embodies that right.2s°
In such circumstances, it might be desirable to set the default rule at
exactly what the parties would not have agreed to had they bargained over
the issue-the so-called "penalty default. " 25' In this context, the penalty
default would be set to allow damages for infringement if the aggrieved
licensee resells or covers. The penalty default would give the licensee the
incentive to raise and resolve the issue and prevent the parties from
foisting costs off on the courts ex post.
However, the penalty default is not appropriate in all circumstances. 22 In particular, default rules should be set in such a manner as to

contractual incompleteness is that the transaction costs of explicitly contracting over a
particular issue may exceed the benefits of such contracting and citing authorities to this
effect). In this case, the licensee would have an incentive to raise the issue and clarify the
legal rule if the transaction costs of discussing and resolving the issue were I :ss than the
expected value of damages the licensee would have to pay if the licensor breached, the

licensee resold or covered and had to pay the licensor infringement damages. The expected
value would be calculated roughly as follows: P(licensor's breach) X P(infringement damages
would be awarded) X (magnitude of infringement damages).
248. See id. at 93
(The "would have wanted" approach to gap filling is a natural outgrowth of the
transaction cost explanation of contractual incompleteness. Lawmakers can minimize
the costs of contracting by choosing the default that most parties would have wanted.
If there are transaction costs of explicitly contracting on a contingency, the parties
may prefer to leave the contract incomplete. Indeed, as transaction costs increase, so
does the parties' willingness to accept a default that is not exactly what they would
have contracted for. Scholars who attribute contractual incompleteness to transaction
costs are naturally drawn toward choosing defaults that the majority of contracting
parties "would have wanted" because these majoritarian defaults seem to minimize
the costs of contracting.).
249. See id. (noting that costs of ex ante bargaining may encourage parties to leave gaps
for a court to fill in and contending: "[i]f it is costly for the courts to determine what the
parties would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the parties
to contract explicitly").
250. See generaly Merges, supra note 41 (contending that one reason a property rights
regime is appropriate in the case of patents is that.it is difficult for courts to set damages).
251. SeeAyres & Gertner, supra note 76, at 95-100.
252. See id. at 127 (noting that penalty defaults are not always appropriate and the decision
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give an incentive to the relatively informed party to disclose information to
the relatively uninformed: in other words, default rules should be drawn
against the informed party.2 5 Between the licensor and licensee, the
licensor is likely to be relatively more informed. Licensors are probably
more often "repeat players" in these types of transactions, if only because
of the inexhaustibility which characterizes intellectual property rights.25
Given the fact that licensors are likely to be more informed than licensees
or at least no less informed, this context also argues for setting the default
rule at no damages for infringement when the aggrieved licensee exercises
its right to resell or cover., 5
Moreover, the costs which the parties foist off on the court system in
calculating damages are likely to be small under a default rule allowing the
licensee to resell or cover without infringement. One of the innovations of
the UCC remedies is their certainty-often cases will not even proceed to
trial because damages are quite simple to calculate. This is particularly
likely when the object of the damage claim is an Article 2 good. While the
intellectual property right itself is likely to be unique, the product which
embodies it often is not. In such cases, the parties are not foisting an
insuperable burden onto the courts and the regular default-that to which
the parties would have agreed-is appropriate.
(c) The informed licensee who bargains over the issue
The informed licensee may decide instead to negotiate over remedies
in light of the legal uncertainty that it will be liable for infringement
damages if it exercises its resale or cover remedies in the event of the
licensor's breach. There are a number of ways in which the parties might
take this legal risk into account.
Perhaps the most obvious solution for the licensee is to bargain for a
resale or cover right free of infringement liability as part of the contractual
negotiations.256 Of course, the licensee, in obtaining a right which it is
not clear it possesses at law, will have to pay for that right either in the

to impose a penalty default requires detailed consideration).
253. See id. at 98 ("[W]hen the rationale is to inform the relatively uninformed contracting
party, the penalty default should be against the relatively informed party.").
254. See id. ("If one side is repeatedly in the relevant contractual setting while the other
side rarely is, it is a sensible presumption that the former is better informed than the latter.").
See generally Barnett, supra note 76, at 887-88 (noting that repeat players can amortize the cost
of obtaining knowledge of the relevant legal rules over a large number of transactions while a
one-time entrant cannot and therefore may rationally choose not to inform itself of the legal
rule).
255. Cf Craswell, supranote 81, at 633 (summarizing the default rules theory of selecting a
legal rule that reflects what the parties would have agreed to and noting that such a selection
may be justified as avoiding negotiation costs, drafting costs, and difficulties caused by
strategic bargaining).
256. See id. at 633 (noting that the parties have the ability to escape an inefficient remedy
by contracting around it).
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price directly or by acceding to the licensor's demands on some other
issue.
Alternatively, it may simply adjust the price to account for the risk of
the licensor's breach and the effective elimination of a UCC remedy that
would otherwise have protected the licensee against that breach. 217 The
magnitude of the premium or discount which the licensee could charge
would be a function of the competitiveness of the market and other
manufacturers' assessments of the magnitude of the risk created by the
legal rule.
Alternatively or in addition, the licensor could attempt to allay the
licensee's fears by agreeing to a liquidated damages clause.25 There are
some drawbacks to this approach from the licensee's perspective. First, it
lacks the precision of the resale and cover remedies as it may be difficult ex
ante to approximate damages which will result from breach. Second, while
liquidated damages are authorized under the UCG, courts continue to
construe such clauses strictly. 9 Thus, the licensor may agree to such a
clause during negotiations but later successfully challenge it in litigation.
Therefore, the licensee might instead attempt to provide for alternative
dispute resolution or for the licensor 26°to agree at the outset not to
challenge the liquidated damages clause.

257. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the legal rule
on price).
258. A closely related alternative would be for the parties to agree to a limitation of
remedies provision. Section 2-719 of the Code states:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, (a) the agreement may
provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this
Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the
price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; ....
U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (a) (1996). A limitation of remedies provision may, however, be set aside in
favor of the default Code remedies where the provision "fail[s] of its essential purpose."
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1996).
259. Liquidated damages are available tinder § 2-718 of the Code:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at
an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1996). Courts have construed this clause strictly and often seem to read it
as requiring that the liquidated damages be reasonable in light of the actual harm, regardless
of its reasonableness in light of the anticipated harm. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalies and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an
Enforcement Mode and a Theory of Jfirient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 559 (1977) (noting
that courts will not uniformly find liquidated damages clauses enforceable unless certain
requirements have been met).
260. Depending on the particular arrangement, such provisions are likely enforceable. See
Dan B. Dobbs, 3 Dobbs Law of Remedies § 12.23, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the
enforceability of arbitration agreements); 15 Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 1823
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Another contract solution would be to make the license grant
irrevocable such that the license would continue in the event of
termination of the underlying agreement. Licensors are generally wary of
such agreements as they may effectively relinquish a substantial amount of
control over the exploitation of their intellectual property right by granting
an irrevocable license.2 6 ' For this reason, the licensee would probably
have to pay a substantial premium in exchange for the grant of
irrevocability. Less drastic approaches would include allowing the license to
62
continue only until the inventory on hand at the time of breach is sold
or shortening the contract term.2 s
To hedge its risk, where the licensee is effectively a seller, it might
underinvest in transaction-specific assets.

2

It may seek to perform its

contract with the licensor by using equipment and parts which may be
used for a variety of purposes rather than just to meet the specific
requirements of the licensor. From the licensor's perspective, this may be
undesirable if it impacts the quality of the finished product. The licensor
therefore may seek to lease machines to the licensee or otherwise attempt
to encourage investment.
The licensee might also seek to purchase insurance against the
licensor's breach. However, because the breach is within the licensor's
control, the premiums on such insurance are likely to be substantial.
Another, perhaps less expensive way for the licensee to insure against
losses from the licensor's breach would be for it to diversify away some of
its risk by entering into a number of different transactions with a number
of different licensors.'6 However, this may effectively increase costs to the
licensor who now may have to enter into an agreement with multiple
licensees. Moreover, this option may not be available at all if there is no
close substitute for the licensor's product.
As set forth above, in contexts in which the licensee is uninformed,

(Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d. ed. 1971) (discussing contracts not to sue); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 285 (same).
261. Cf. Dratler, supra note 103, § 1.041l], at 1-29 (noting that licensing necessarily
involves some loss of control over the exploitation of one's intellectual property rights).
262. See infra note 268 (citing form contracts with such provisions).
263. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost
Economics: A Review and Assessment; 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 335, 346-47 (1995) (noting that
"contract terms become shorter. . . as uncertainty increases").
264. See id. at 341 (listing types of asset specificity). The decision to invest in transactionspecific assets is a difficult one since the more transaction-specific investments the licensee
makes, the greater the opportunism of the licensor at the time of renegotiation. Cf. id. at 336
(noting that because of contractual incompleteness, "parties who invest in relationship-specific
assets expose themselves to a hazard: if circumstances change, their trading partners may try
to expropriate the rents accruing to the specifc assets").
265. This strategy is a variant of what Professor Craswell calls the "selection" decision
which "is an attempt to reduce the risk by finding some other, less-risky party to deal with."
Craswell, supra note 81, at 652 (footnote omitted); see also Farber, supra note 79, at 1448
(noting that to protect against breach "individuals can search for partners with a low
propensity to breach").
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there is an efficiency argument for clarifying the default rule to allow the
aggrieved licensee to resell or cover without incurring liability for
infringement. The same clarification also is appropriate in cases in which
the parties are informed but choose not to negotiate over the particular
issue. The remaining question then becomes: is that default still
appropriate if parties are accounting for this risk in their contracts? This
Article asserts that the answer to this question is "yes," because current law
allocates remedial rights inefficiently by making the resale and cover
remedies unattractive and, in the worst case, may discourage parties from
reaching agreement
at all despite the fact that both could realize a gain
2
from contracting. C
This assignment of entitlements reverses the normal UCC scheme
which, as noted, was designed to encourage efficiency. Making one of the
remedies routinely available to aggrieved parties unattractive frustrates the
flexibility which the UCC incorporated in order to encourage the parties
to act in an efficient manner. Moreover, even if the parties are able to
reach an agreement, this risk allocation skews the bargaining process by
allowing the licensor to capture more of the surplus than it otherwise
might. Simply put, instead of the licensor, who would otherwise have to
raise the issue of eliminating an already existing UCC remedy and bargain
away something in return for its elimination, the burden is on the licensee
to raise the issue and bargain away something else to reinstate remedies
which it thought it already had until the Burbenrys case. The result is that
the bargaining process is skewed in favor of the licensor. This analysis
suggests that even in cases in which there is an underlying intellectual
property license, normal UCC remedies should be available as long as they
do not adversely impact the goals of intellectual property law.
There is a fairly forceful objection to this analysis. Economics is not
concerned with the allocation of the surplus between the parties.6 7
Whether the licensor or licensee is able to capture more of the contracting

266. Of course, even where there would be a surplus from cooperation and the market is
not distorted, the parties still may not reach agreement. The point is that they are likely to
reach agreement in even fewer instances under the current damages scheme. This is
particularly likely in cases involving a bilateral monopoly. Bilateral monopoly describes a
market in which there is only one buyer and one seller. See Gooter & Ulen, supra note 20, at
37 n.8. The seller/licensor may be in a monopoly position given its intellectual property right
while it is also possible that the buyer/licensee may be the only firm able fully to exploit or in
need of the intellectual property right. In the best of situations, bilateral monopolies are
characterized by high transaction costs and hard bargaining. See Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 54 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that with property rights in ideas there may be
excessive investment). Despite the fact that an exchange might generate a surplus, "each party
may be so determined to engross the greater part of the potential profits from the transaction
that they never succeed in coming to terms." IX. (footnote omitted).
267. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Effidency of Spedfic Performance: Toard a Unified Theory of
Contract RemediY, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341, 383 (1984) (asserting that economics is not concerned
with the division of the surplus from exchange but with ensuring that assets move to their
highest valued use at the least cost).
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surplus in the negotiation over UCC remedies is a distributive rather than

an allocative concern. Moreover, one might expect that if the licensee's
retention of the right of resale or cover is the efficient allocation of
remedial rights, then that term will become the standard, particularly in a
case in which the law is uncertain. In other words, there is a price attached
to the menu of remedial options. If the licensee's having the right to cover
or resell is efficient, the licensor will agree to it because the licensor will
then be able to obtain a higher price for the intellectual property it is
licensing. Thus, it will be in the interest of both parties to bargain to the
efficient result.
Although this objection has force, it ignores the transaction cost
considerations mentioned above. Transaction costs could be saved by
setting the default rule at the efficient outcome rather than by forcing the
parties to bargain to it. It would take some time before any contractual
term would gain such universal acceptance as to merit its becoming a
standard. It therefore seems sensible to save those interim transaction
costs by clarifying the legal rule.
Additionally, it is not at all clear that the parties would necessarily
arrive at the efficient allocation of remedial provisions. In deciding
whether a particular outcome is efficient, the law looks to aggregate
efficiepscy. The parties to specific transactions, however, are concerned not
with aggregate efficiency but rather with capturing as much of the surplus
as possible to enhance their own individual returns. When the legal rule
gives the licensor a sword to attempt to capture more of the surplus, the
deal becomes relatively less attractive to the licensee. While the parties
might bargain to the efficient risk allocation, they might also fail to reach
agreement at all as they engage in strategic behavior. Thus, it seems
preferable to have the parties start the negotiations with the efficient
allocation of remedies.
Finally, in some cases, parties will opt to adjust other aspects of the
bargain to account for the law's uncertainty rather than to negotiate to the
efficient remedial allocation. However, there are costs associated with such
adjustments. For example, the licensee may overinvest in precaution to
help assure that it will be protected in the event of breach.2 "9 Alternative-

268. The form books are inconclusive. See, e.g., Lindey & Landau, supra note 101, at Form
13.01-6, 13-55 (providing for licensee to continue to sell inventory on hand at time of
termination for three months after termination); Milgrim, supra note 101, at VIIIB, VIII-8
(providing for the licensee to continue to sell inventory on hand at the time of termination
for six months after termination); id. at VIIIB, VIIIB-14 (providing for a patent licensee to
dispose of patented products for a defined period after termination if the products were
manufactured prior to termination). But see Raymond C. Nordhaus, Patent License
Agreements Form 40.03, at 40-11 (providing a number of alternatives from which the parties
may choose including immediate termination of the license with no right to resell goods on
hand and termination with a limited right to resell).
269. See itL at 646-47 (contending that where damages are overcompensatory, the party
paying such damages has an incentive to overinvest in precaution relative to the efficient
level).
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ly, or in addition, the licensee may alter its decisions about with whom it

will deal to select licensors who are unlikely to breach and seek large
infringement damages. 27' These steps increase costs and skew
decisionmaking and could be avoided merely by clarifying the law.
2. Post-breach considerations
The parties' pre-breach treatment of the remedial issue will also affect
their post-breach stance. In cases in which the parties at the outset failed
explicitly to address the issue, whether because of lack of information or
because to do so would not be cost-effective, their post-breach negotiations
will be affected. The UCC damage provisions have, in addition to making
the law more flexible, provided parties with some degree of certainty.2'
This certainty translates into a framework which informs the parties' postbreach negotiations. For example, in a general UCC transaction, an
aggrieved seller and breaching buyer know with some measure of precision
the damages which the buyer would have to pay under either § 2-706 or §
2-708. This provides the parties with the background against which they
can engage in post-breach settlement negotiations.
In contrast, if there is a risk that a § 2-706 remedy will be held
infringing, there is a large disparity between the relative positions of the
parties under § 2-706 and § 2-708. When the seler/licensee has the goods,
the breaching buyer/licensor's negotiation stance is improved because it
may credibly threaten suit for infringement if the licensee resells,
exercising the licensor's intellectual property rights. 27 As in the case of
negotiations prior to the conclusion of the contract, the unavailability of
the resale and cover remedies alters the bargaining position of the parties
after breach by giving the breaching party a weapon which it otherwise
would not have.27 ' Again, this analysis suggests that even in cases in which
there is an underlying intellectual property license, normal UCC remedies
should be available.
Of course, the same objections raised above might equally apply postbreach. In a world without transaction costs, parties would bargain to the
efficient post-breach outcome so the legal rule does not matter. Moreover,
economics is not concerned with the distribution of the gains on breach
between the parties.
These objections are easily answered. First, there are transaction costs
involved in any negotiation, including a renegotiation after breach.
Second, the remedial rule affects the parties' relative risk and this effect

270. See sura note 265 (describing "selection" decision).
271. Cf supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
272. See Moore & Mayfield, su/m note 9, at 3 (noting that post-breach, "[A) seller who is
an astute negotiator may be willing to grant a license, but only at an unreasonably high cost
from the buyer. Snch a seller might use the threat of an infringement suit as leverage to force
a renegotiation of its underlying sales contract with the buyer").
273. See Craswell, supra note 81, at 640 ("[Rjemedies can still produce distributional effects
by affecting the parties' bargaining status in post-breach negotiations.").
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obtains even when ex post renegotiation is costless. 274 Third, there may be
no gain to distribute on breach-the licensor may breach simply to obtain
large infringement damages or to renegotiate the contract by threatening
an infringement suit, not because it has found another licensee who values
the product more.7

3. The impact on intellectualproperty law
If the maintenance of all UCC remedies were adversely to impact the
goals of the intellectual property system, then it might be preferable to
adopt a rule providing that the aggrieved party's exercise of an intellectual
property right under the UCG is infringement. The primary goal of the
intellectual property system is to enhance the public welfare by
encouraging the production and disemmination of information. A state law
remedy should not frustrate this federal policy.
Allowing all UCC remedies to apply should not discourage authors
and inventors from investing in new works. In the cases under consideration, the licensee has not breached; the licensor/rightholder has. Because
the licensee has not breached, it follows that the goods which it has
produced under license are the genuine articles. Allowing the licensee to
minimize its damages by placing those articles in the stream of commerce
should not affect the licensor's initial decision to invest in innovation. The
value of its right is not devalued by marketing a product that is genuine.
Additionally, it seems intuitively unfair essentially to penalize the
aggrieved party who has performed under the contract by removing one of
its remedial options. In more concrete terms, because intellectual property
damages would be offset against and may even outweigh damages for
breach of contract, the aggrieved party could be in the anomalous position
of having to pay damages to the breaching party. This would strike most as
unfair unless there is some compelling policy reason to support such a
result.

274. See id. at 645
(The level of contract damages will have an effect on the distribution of risks
between the parties, and this effect will be independent of the ease of ex post
renegotation when the seller is considering whether to breach. Even when ex post
renegotiation is costless, the choice of contract remedies can still make a
difference.).
275. See supra note 9 (citing Moore & Mayfield). Note, however that reputational effects
may limit the licensor's ability to breach oportunistically. See Farber, supra note 79, at 1464
(reviewing the potential problems with selecting legal enforcement mechanisms and stating
that "[t]he reason [that people still contract despite the inadequacy of legal remedies] is that
other powerful incentives for performance exist.... Unreliable firms lose good will....
[Such] sanctions arguably make legal incentives to perform unnecessary").
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THE PROPOSAL-AMENDING THE UCC TO CLARIFY THE RIGHTS OF
RESALE AND COVER

The above analysis suggests that the Article 2 remedies of resale and
cover should routinely be available for the goods aspects of intellectual
property transactions and that the law should be clarified to implement a
default rule to this effect. As this Article discusses below, that implementation may require a nuanced approach in which, under certain circumstances, UCC remedies sounding more in a property rules theory than liability
rules theory may be appropriate.
A.

The Proposal-Rethinking§§ 2-706 and 2-712

Perhaps the best way to clarify the law is to modify Article 2 to ensure
that the default remedial scheme which it has set up specifically applies 27to6
the types of intellectual property transactions described in this Article.
Both §§ 2-706 and 2-712 could be amended quite simply through the
addition of one section. 27 Section 2-706(7) could be added, stating that
"In cases in which the seller is also an aggrieved licensee under an
intellectual property license, the seller has an implied intellectual property

276. As a general rule, it is very difficult to amend the UCC because any amendment
normally requires action by the NCCUSL and ALI to draft and to promulgate the change and
then by the states to enact it. However, Article 2 is currently in a state of flux as the NCCUSL
grapples with a number of issues, including the widespread use of computer technology in
conducting commercial transactions. The NCCUSL is currently discussing revisions to Article
2 as well as a new Article 2B to deal specifically with licensing transactions. Thus, the proposal
here is particularly timely because it has a reasonable chance of being acted upon because the
NCCUSL's drafts are still in flux and, even after the draft is promulgated to the states, the
state legislatures are unlikely to adopt it without discussion of the issues in this Article.
277. As written, there is nothing in § 2-706 or § 2-712 that specifically prevents an
aggrieved licensee from reselling or covering with respect to the goods. As noted above, the
doubt arises from an interpretation of the UCC in conjunction with intellectual property law.
At first glance, it would seem that the most appropriate place for change would be the
intellectual property statutes because any change to state law is subject to preemption by
federal law. This Article, however, concentrates on amending the UCC for several reasons.
First, the uncertainty in the transactions at issue arises largely because it is within the court's
discretion as to whether a license will be implied under particular circumstances. Once a
license is implied, there is no conflict with intellectual property law. Thus, because the right
to resell or cover arises in these transactions from an implied license which is a matter of state
law, a logical starting point for change is the UCC. By granting the implied license within the
statutory wording of the UCC, the proposal removes the court's discretion beyond
determining whether or not a breach has occurred. Second, as a practical matter, the chances
for actual change to the UCC are fairly good at this time because the NCCUSL, ALI and
states are all discussing major changes. See supra note 276. It would be difficult to successfully
convince Congress to tackle this issue despite the fact that the changes to the intellectual
property statutes would probably be quite minimal. The best way to implement the
clarification would be under the infringement sections of each statute. These sections could
be amended by adding a provision indicating that a licensee's continued exercise of its license
rights is not an infringement when the licensor has breached the contract, unless the licensor
breached the agreement because the agreement purported to grant rights the licensor did not
have.
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license under the contract to resell the goods under this Section."
Similarly, § 2-712(4) could be added stating that "In cases in which the
buyer is also an aggrieved licensee under an intellectual property license,
the buyer has an implied intellectual property license under the contract
to cover under this Section." To prevent confusion, definitions of
"intellectual property right" and "intellectual property license" could be
added to § 1-201 or § 2-103Y
These changes should effectively preserve the Article 2 remedies of
resale and cover. The breaching licensor could not successfully bring an
action for intellectual property infringement because the aggrieved seller
or buyer would have an implied license to resell or cover under the UCC.
These implied licenses would be available as a matter of course whenever a
breach occurred, rather than based on a court's subjective evaluation of all
the facts and circumstances. Additionally, these clarifications would work as
most Article 2 rules do-as default rules. The parties would remain free to
contract around them. A licensee could give up its UCC rights to resell or
to cover in its contract with the licensor.2 79 The difference is that the
initial assignment of the entitlement would now be with the party who
values it the most.
B. An Evaluation of the Proposal
While the proposal set forth above may be intuitively appealing
because of its simplicity, it warrants closer evaluation to determine whether
its impact on the parties, the courts, and the goals of intellectual property
law and the UCC is desirable. This analysis suggests that courts, in addition
to giving effect to the new statutory language, should also begin
invigorating the actions for the price and specific performance in
transactions involving goods protected by intellectual property rights.
As a practical matter, the suggested changes would probably be most
evident at the preliminary injunction stage. Particularly when the licensee
is in the position of an aggrieved seller, it is very likely that the licensor
will know of the licensee's attempts to resell. s The licensor may then

278. These definitions could be analogous to those proposed in Article 2B: "Intellectual
property rights includes all rights in information created under patent, copyright, trade secret,
trademark, and any similar state or federal law," U.C.C. § 2B-102(20) (Proposed Official Draft
1996) [hereinafter Revised UCCI;
"License" means a contract for transfer of rights in information which expressly
makes the rights conditional or limited, whether or not it provides for delivery or
sale of a copy of the information. The term includes an access contract, a data
processing contract, but does not include a software contract which transfers
ownership of the intellectual property rights in the software. The term does not
include the reservation or creation of a security interest in information.
Id. at § 2B-102(22).
279. Of course, there may be circumstances in which a court may want to scrutinize the
licensee's relinquishment of these rights. Courts already have this power under other UCC
provisions. See supra note 75 (identifying some Code sections limiting parties' ability to
contract around the Code).
280. To comply with § 2-706, the aggrieved seller must notify the buyer of the seller's
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sue for a preliminary injunction to stop the resale. Courts then may have
to consider the merits of the breach of contract claim more closely in
preliminary injunction phases to determine whether, in fact, the licensee's
claim of breach is likely to succeed. This does not present an insuperable
burden, especially because courts have the institutional competence with
which to address breach of contract claims. More difficult questions arise,
however, when the validity of the resale or cover is contested only after it
has occurred.
1. Preemption and breadth concerns
When the resale or cover is contested only after it has occurred and is
then found wrongful, the intellectual property rightholder may be
irreparably damaged. This possibility, along with the chance that a court
might err in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction, may discourage
licensing transactions. This in turn may result in inefficiencies other than
those which the resale and cover rules were trying to overcome. By
operation of the state law rule, rightholders may be unable to appropriate
the maximum return on their investment in the information for which the
particular federal right has been granted. In the worst case, the underlying
goal of intellectual property law may be frustrated as society will not
benefit from the production and dissemination of information because of
underinvestment. Authors and inventors may underinvest in developing
information if they believe that the value of the resulting intellectual
property rights have been eroded by a state law contract remedy.
This series of concerns sounds mostly in preemption. Under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, a state law rule may be preempted if
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 21' Preemption under the Patent and Lanham
Acts is solely constitutionally based while preemption under the Copyright
2 2
Act may be based on the Constitution or on § 301 of the Act itself.
Under either a constitutional or statutory preemption analysis, the
suggested changes should survive. They do not directly conflict with any
provision of the intellectual property statutes. The conflict arises in the
event that courts erroneously deny preliminary injunctions or licensees

intent to exercise its right to resell. See § 2-706(3), (4)(b) (1996) (requiring seller to notify
buyer of private sale and of time and place of public resale).
281. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1996) provides:
On and afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106... and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103 ...are governed exclusively by this title.
Even after the enactment of § 301, constitutional preemption is still likely to apply in
copyright cases. Se Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Im)ule, 78 Va. L Rev. 149, 156 n.22 (1992) (stating that inquiry whether state
law interferes with congressional intentions should survive existence of § 301).
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exercise the self-help remedies of resale or cover wrongfully. There is
always a chance that courts will be mistaken in their decisions, so that does
not seem a particularly compelling reason for a preemption finding. It is
also possible that a licensee may wrongfully exercise the resale or cover
remedies. However, both the UCC, with its good faith requirements, and
intellectual property law, with its injunction and damages provisions
deterring infringement, 2"s would serve to discourage such conduct. In
other words, the damage to the rightholder should not ultimately be
irreparable even if it occurs.
However, the suggestion that allowing all UCC remedies will
discourage licensing transactions is not so farfetched as to be dismissed out
of hand. Licensing transactions often involve the exchange of confidential
information from the licensor to the licensee. If the licensor is faced with
the possibility that, in the event of its breach, its confidential information
will be placed in the hands of some third party unknown at the time the
original license is concluded, the licensor may be wary of ever entering
into licensing transactions. Moreover, if the licensor breaches because it
does not actually have the rights it purported to license, the true
rightholder would undoubtedly object to the licensee's pointing to the
UCC as authority for it to exercise rights which it never had.
In fact, these examples only serve to illustrate the UCC's flexibility.
Under § 2-706, any resale must be made in good faith and be commercially
reasonable. Under § 2-712, any cover purchase must be made in good faith
and must be reasonable. These requirements could help ensure that any
third party is bound by the confidentiality requirements of the original
license. A resale or cover purchase which did not so bind the third party
would be unreasonable and in bad faith. In like manner, a licensee's resale
or cover under circumstances in which the licensor was not authorized to
grant the rights conveyed would not be commercially reasonable.
It seems more likely that the suggested changes would be fully
consistent with the goals of intellectual property law. The changes
encourage licensees to enter into licensing transactions without
discouraging licensors. 84 The initial right allocation-a licensee with a
right of resale or cover unless expressly negated-would now be the
efficient one, thus advancing the goals of the UCC. This result also seems
fair because the aggrieved party would not be put in a position in which it
would be open to potentially large liability as an infringer and perhaps

283. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence goal).
284. See Moore & Mayfield, supra note 9, at 3 (advocating an implied patent license to
cover internally and stating:
Inventors will not avoid the patent system simply because they know aggrieved buyers
will be able to practice the inventors' patents if the inventors breach sales contracts.
On the contrary, ensuring internal cover as a remedy will merely bring certainty into
planning transactions relating to patented goods. This certainty will presumably
facilitate the parties' involvement in such transactions and, thereby, indirectly foster
economic exploitation of patented inventions).
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have to pay the breaching party rather than being compensated itself.
(a) Trademark v. patent and copyright
This reasoning may be more persuasive with respect to the patent and
copyright laws than trademark law. Trademark law embodies a consumer
protection goal that the other two statutes do not.2 5 The Restatement
drafters opted for a legal rule which finds trademark infringement
whenever the licensee sells without authorization, irrespective of which
party breached the contract. 286 In contrast, the Mitsuboshi court held that
where the licensor had breached the contract, the licensee was granted an
implied trademark license to resell the genuine goods.217 The Monte Carlo
court expansively held that even when the licensee had breached the
contract, the licensee could still resell the goods as long as the goods were
genuine. 288
The Restatement drafters proceeded under the assumption that the
protection of an implied license and the right to resell was not necessary
for an aggrieved trademark licensee because the trademark may always be
removed and the goods then resold. 2 9 An aggrieved patent or copyright
licensee is not in the same position. It would be a rare case in which the
licensee could remove the material relating to the patent or copyright and
still have a product left to resell. In contrast, the trademark licensee can
almost always remove the trademark and recover its costs in so doing as
incidental damages.
Arguably, the Restatement, by focusing primarily on a consumer
protection goal, overlooks the damage mitigation goals of contract law. It is
wasteful to force an aggrieved licensee to expend the resources to remove
the trademark prior to resale, particularly because: (i) if the licensor has
breached, there is no issue regarding the genuineness or quality of the
goods;28 and (ii) the licensee's recovery of the money spent on such an
effort is speculative. The end result may be to introduce market

285. "The rules governing the protection of trademarks are intended to prevent the
diversion of trade or harm to reputation that is likely to result if consumers are confused as to
the source or sponsorship of goods and services." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§ 24, cmt. b (1995).
286. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (quoting the language of § 24 of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition).
287. See supranote 147.
288. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and view of the
court in Monte Carlo).
289. "Because a trademark owner who wrongfully rejects trademarked goods will be liable
for any reduction in resale value caused by removal of the mark, the better policy is to protect
consumers from the confusion that results if unauthorized goods are sold under the mark of
the trademark owner." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 24, cmt. c (1995).
290. Trademark licenses normally contain detailed quality requirements to help assure the
continuing validity of the mark. If the licensee has not breached the contract, it must still be
complying with those quality requirements.
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inefficiencies that only serve to frustrate the consumer protection goal the
Restatement was meant to advance. J ' Moreover, the proposal advanced
here does consider consumer protection by adopting Mitsuboshi but
rejecting Monte Carlo-there is no right to resell with the trademark
attached when the licensee itself breaches.
(b) Alternative approaches
If policymakers were concerned about the resale and cover remedies
unduly discouraging licensing transactions, investment in developing
information, or frustrating the consumer protection goal of trademark law,
they might consider changes alternative to or in addition to those
suggested above. More specifically, policymakers might encourage granting
the price under § 2-709 to licensees in the position of aggrieved sellers and
specific performance under § 2-716 to licensees in the position of
aggrieved buyers. These UCC sections more closely resemble property rules
than the rest of the UCC remedial provisions.
In the case of the licensee as aggrieved seller, the overall premise for
denying the price in most cases may be missing. The UCC normally awards
the price to an aggrieved seller when the seller's presumed advantage in
resale is missing.2 2 In the context of intellectual property transactions, it
is reasonable to assert that the licensor/buyer who owns the particular
intellectual property right has at least as much market knowledge as the
licensee/seller. The licensor has probably researched the market prior to
deciding to invest in the particular innovative activity and has also likely
researched it again in searching for the licensee. Thus, the licensee/seller's
advantage in resale may be missing, and it may be appropriate to award
the price to the aggrieved licensee. The licensor would then receive and
resell or scrap the goods. A rule awarding the price would not have the
potential to discourage licensing transactions or investment in innovative
activities in the same way that a rule permitting resale might. If the
aggrieved seller receives the price, the licensor/buyer would receive the
goods, and therefore would not be concerned that its intellectual property
rights would somehow be devalued by the licensee's resale.
There is no statutory provision which currently would award the price
to the aggrieved licensee in these circumstances.2's From a licensee's
291. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for creating the
UCc).
292. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing the seller's remedy of the
price).
293. Perhaps the price could be awarded under § 2-709(1)(b):
When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the next section, the price ... (b) of
goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell
them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort
will be unavailing.
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perspective, the price may be a less desirable remedy if it increases the
chance that it will have to resort to litigation rather than a self-help resale.
However, allowing the seller to recover the price is less likely to frustrate
the underlying goals of the intellectual property system. Therefore, such a
rule might be more likely to survive a preemption analysis.
When the licensee is an aggrieved buyer, it may be appropriate to
award specific performance under § 2-716 as a matter of course. The
licensee would receive the goods for which it contracted and the licensor
would not run the risk of being damaged by an inappropriate cover.24 As
noted above, the remedy of specific performance could be justified under
current statutory wording because goods in which an intellectual property
right inheres could be considered "unique" within the ordinary meaning of
that word. It may be very difficult either to cover or to fix damages because
a substitute purchase may not approximate the item contracted for,
particularly where the item is patented. J
Generally, an action for the price or specific performance would be
most appropriate when damages are difficult to calculate-one of the
traditional justifications for using property rules. Thus, if the Article 2
good embodying the intellectual property right-as distinct from the
property right itself-were truly unique, then it might be appropriate to
award damages under the UCC's property rules.
Such damages also may be appropriate when the parties are engaged
in a one-time or end-game deal. If the parties expect to have an ongoing
relationship, there is every reason to expect that in the event of a
particular breach, they will negotiate to settle it. However, if the parties do
not expect to deal with each other again, they may have an incentive to
behave opportunistically, and the chances that the intellectual property
right may be devalued through a wrongful resale or cover seem higher in
those circumstances.
As a general rule, preemption concerns should not be implicated if

U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1996).
This section was intended to deal with circumstances in which, for some reason, the seller's
resale market had disappeared. It could be extended to deal with circumstances in which the
licensor has breached an intellectual property license, but the courts fear that allowing resale
would damage the licensor, or more broadly, discourage others from entering into licensing
transactions. In such cases, the language "the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing" could be interpreted to allow the licensee to recover the price.
Admittedly, this approach stretches the ordinary meaning of the words but could be simply
implemented through a comment to § 2-709 or a Permanent Editorial Board Commentary.
294. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
295. Cf.Merges, supranote 41, at 77 ("[Bly definition each asset covered by a patent is in
some sense unique - a characteristic guaranteed by various requirements for protectability in
the patent statute... . "); Schwartz, supra note 79, at 276 ("As product differentiation
becomes more common, the supply of products that will substitute precisely for the
promisor's performance is reduced."); Paul DeAngelis, Note, Compulter Resale Contracts: The
Casefor Adopting a Buyer's Lost Profit Remedy under the Uniforn Commercial Code 7 & n.21 (1995)
(on file with author) (noting that customers often will not accept substitutes when contracting
for brand name computers).
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the proposal were implemented. However, if recognizing UCC remedies
should, in practice, adversely impact the incentives for licensing, the
drafters should encourage courts to award the price or specific
performance routinely.
Finally, the breadth of the proposed revision should be addressed. It
deals only with intellectual property licensees, not mere sellers and buyers.
The proposal here is limited to granting implied licenses to intellectual
property licensees, not generic buyers. Under the proposal, in the Finley
case, Asphalt Paving, a generic buyer of a patented cement mixer, would
be relegated to (a) making a cover purchase of another cement mixer
which did not practice the Finley patents; (b) seeking specific performance; or (c) practicing Finley's patents in covering and relying not on
the statutory wording of the UCC but rather a court's discretion in
implying a license (as it did in the Finley case).
The proposal is framed in this manner to recognize both the
theoretical considerations of intellectual property law and practical
commercial realities. Almost every mass-marketed product is patented or
otherwise protected by an intellectual property right. Many of these
products have close substitutes such that a reasonable cover purchase
without implicating intellectual property rights is not merely likely, it is
probable. For example, if Coca-Cola had a patent on its formula and were
to breach a contract to supply a restaurant with Diet Coke, the restaurant
could cover by purchasing Diet Pepsi. Coca-Cola would likely be both
shocked and dismayed if the UCC were to be interpreted as authorizing
the aggrieved restaurant to license its patents to a third party to produce
the Diet Coke. The remedy in these cases could have a significant chilling
effect not just on commerce, but also on the goals of the intellectual
property system. Every buyer would essentially become a compulsory
licensee.
In contrast, when there is an actual license transaction, it is much
more likely that the licensee is relying on the specific goods. The licensee
has entered into the transaction relying on an ability to exercise the rights
of the licensor rather than merely to purchase a good from a seller. It
seems appropriate in those cases to allow cover by use of the intellectual
property rights or to compel specific performance. The same need does
not obtain in the generic sale of a patented, copyrighted, or trademarked
item.2j " In idiosyncratic circumstances in which it would be appropriate
to allow a generic buyer to exercise the seller's intellectual property rights,
a court would be free to imply such a license after a consideration of all
the facts. The license, however, would not be granted by statute.

296. Of course, a buyer may still be entitled to specific performance if it is unable to cover
because the item is covered by the intellectual property right and there is no viable substitute.
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2. Analogies to other law
The problem of determining the appropriate remedy in intellectual
property licensing transactions is currently being considered by the drafters
of proposed Article 2B of the UCC. Article 2B is intended to apply to the
licensing of information. Information is defined to include "data, text,
images, sounds, computer programs, software, databases, and the like, and
any associated intellectual property rights."2 7 However, it does not apply
to intellectual property rights "to the extent not related to computer
software or databases."2 s Thus, Article 2B does not grapple with the
question of the appropriate remedy when the license includes a right to
manufacture goods covered by Article 2. The draft remedies are
nonetheless useful to consider in evaluating the revisions proposed herein.
Under Article 2B, the aggrieved licensee may select to recover the
contract-market differential as damages or the "difference between the
value of the performance accepted, and the value if there had been no
defect."2>" However, the licensee, rather than opting for a damages
remedy, may continue to use the information under the contract terms.
Proposed § 2B-716 states:
On breach by the licensor, the licensee may continue to exercise
rights under the contract. If the licensee elects to continue to
exercise rights, the following rules apply:
(1) The licensee is bound by all of the terms and conditions
of the contract, including restrictions.., and any obligations to
make license fee or royalty payments.
(2) The licensee may pursue remedies with respect to
accepted transfers or performance...
(3) The licensor's rights and remedies in the event of breach
remain in effect as if the licensor had not been in breach.3 t
The draft does not indicate the relationship between termination of
the license on breach by the licensor and the remedy of continued use.
The remedy of continued use, though, does seem to be analogous to the
remedy proposal suggested in this Article. In the same way that the drafters
of Article 2B would allow the licensee to exercise rights under the contract
in the event of the licensor's breach, the proposal at issue would also allow
the licensee a limited license to continue to exercise its rights under the
contract in order to fix its damages. Additionally, in the same way that
Article 2B would require the licensee to continue to comply with its
obligations, the suggested changes would at least require the licensee to
safeguard any confidential information under the rubrics of "good faith"
and "reasonableness."
Article 2B then offers indirect support for the proposal suggested
297.

Revised UCO, sufln- note 278, at § 2B-102(18).

298.
299.
300.

d. at § 2B-103(d)(4).
Id. at § 2B-709(a)(1)(c).
Id. at § 2B-716.
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here. It adopts a remedy similar in effect to the proposal outlined above.
Presumably, the drafters have concluded that such a remedy will further
the statutory goals of modernization, flexibility, and uniformity as outlined
in § 1-102 (2).
The proposal here also bears some resemblance to § 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code. "0' Prior to the enactment of § 365(n), intellectual
property licensees ran the risk of being unfairly surprised by the
termination of their licenses in bankruptcy. If the licensor were to go
bankrupt, the license might be deemed an executory contract which the
trustee could set aside if its operation would be burdensome for the
bankruptcy estate. Section 365(n) modified the prior law by allowing
intellectual property licensees to elect to retain their license rights in the
event of the licensor's bankruptcy. If a licensee opts to retain its rights, the
licensee is still obligated to make payments due under the contract. The
underlying purpose of § 365(n) was to "promote the development and
licensing of intellectual property by providing certainty to licensees in
situations where the licensor files bankruptcy and seeks to reject the
license agreement as an executory contract. " 0 2
The proposal suggested here is somewhat similar, again because it
allows the licensee a limited right of continued use. It too is targeted
towards providing certainty in the law so that the parties to a negotiation
understand the pre- and post-breach remedial framework. It also should
work towards promoting licensing transactions by assuring licensees that all
UCC remedies will be available to them.
CONCLUSION

As society becomes more dependent on information technologies,
previously separate spheres of law are likely to collide with increasing
frequency. A case in point is intellectual property law and contract,
particularly the UCC. Each law has its own underlying rationale to which
its remedial provisions help to give effect. Thus, any case in which one set
of remedies is given precedence over another should be closely scrutinized
for its impact on underlying statutory goals.
This Article has identified one such collision-that between
intellectual property liability for infringement and UCC remedies for
aggrieved licensees. It has suggested that allowing UCC remedies essentially
to trump intellectual property remedies in such cases is not merely
appropriate, it is also desirable. Allowing UCC remedies to continue to
apply furthers underlying UCC goals while not frustrating the intellectual
property scheme.
The analysis employed in this Article should prove useful in helping
to develop a comprehensive contractual law of intellectual property. The

301.

11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994).

302. H.R. Rep. No. 100-1012, at 6 (1988).
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methodology suggested is first to' identify, the underlying policies of
intellectual property law and contract. Particular intellectual property or
contractual rules may then be better understood in terms of the overall
theoretical framework which supports the statutory or common law
implementation of those rules. Where those rules seemingly collide, a
compromise may be appropriate to effect the goals of both sets of laws. If
that compromise is not feasible then at least the issue has been sharpened
in such a manner that policymakers may make reasoned choices about
what goals should be given precedence. This method of decisionmaking is
preferable to ad hoc judicial review which may serve neither to enhance
the intellectual property system nor to further the goal of coherent
contract law.

